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ABSTRACT

During a cyber-attack, an adversary executes offensive maneuvers to target computer
systems. Particularly, an attacker often exploits a vulnerability within a program, hijacks
control-flow, and executes malicious code. Data Execution Prevention (DEP), a
hardware-enforced security feature, prevents an attacker from directly executing the
injected malicious code. Therefore, attackers have resorted to code-reuse attacks, wherein
carefully chosen fragments of code within existing code sections of a program are
sequentially executed to accomplish malicious logic. Code-reuse attacks are ubiquitous and
account for majority of the attacks in the wild. On one hand, due to the wide use of
closed-source software, binary-level solutions are essential. On the other hand, without
access to source-code and debug-information, defending raw binaries is hard.
A majority of defenses against code-reuse attacks enforce ”control-flow integrity”, a
program property that requires the runtime execution of a program to adhere to a
statically determined control-flow graph (CFG) – a graph that captures the intended flow
of control within the program. While defenses against code-reuse attacks have focused on
reducing the attack space, due to the lack of high-level semantics in the binary, they lack in
precision, which in turn results in smaller yet significant attack space.
This dissertation presents program integrity models aimed at narrowing the attack
space available to execute code-reuse attacks. First, we take a semantic-recovery approach
to restrict the targets of indirect branches in a binary. Then, we further improve the

precision by recovering C++-level semantics, and enforce a strict integrity model that
improves precision for virtual function calls in the binary. Finally, in order to further
reduce the attack space, we take a different perspective on defense against code-reuse
attacks, and introduce Stack-Pointer Integrity – a novel integrity model targeted at
ensuring the integrity of stack pointer as opposed to the instruction pointer.
Our results show that the semantic-recovery-based approaches can help in significantly
reducing the attack space by improving the precision of the underlying CFG. Function-level
semantic recovery can eliminate 99.47% of inaccurate targets, whereas recovering virtual
callsites and VTables at a C++ level can eliminate 99.99% of inaccurate targets.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Several of the critical public and private infrastructures – that define life as we know it –
are comprised of interconnected software components. In fact, we are so dependent on
software that their safety and reliability directly impact human life. Over the last few
years, attacks against software have increased at an alarming rate. With wide deployment
of Data Execution Prevention (DEP) [1] in the hardware, attackers have resorted to
reusing code fragments in existing code sections of a binary. Such attacks are called
code-reuse attacks. There has been a systematic transition from individuals indulging in
mischief for the purpose of attention-gaining, to well organized sometimes state sponsored
syndicates capable of executing complex attacks (e.g., Sony Hack [2], Stuxnet [3]).
Now more than ever, there is a need to automatically protect binaries from attacks.
Particularly, with wide use of closed source software, binary-only solutions are a necessity.
While source code based approaches can leverage the rich program semantics available from
source code (e.g., [4], [5], [6]) binary-only defenses are hard, and introduce key challenges.
State-of-the-art binary-level solutions enforce program integrity policies in order to
provide principled defense. This dissertation focuses on providing precise program integrity
models on the binary with focus on reducing the attack space for code-reuse attacks.
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DEP + Stack Guard

Total-CFI

vfGuard

SPI

Defenses
Code-reuse
Attacks

ROP
[Shacham'07]

ROP Still
Dangerous
[Carlini'14]

COOP
[Schuster'15]

Fig. 1.1.: Attack space reduction

1.1

Dissertation Overview

A program integrity solution comprises of two components: Policy Generation and
Policy Enforcement. While Policy Generation aims at generating more precise policies that
can thwart code-reuse attacks, enforcement focuses on enforcing the derived policy in a
performance-friendly manner.
Our contribution in policy generation is summarized in Figure 1.1. The figure is
annotated with code-reuse attacks that are capable of targeting each level of defense. We
present Total-CFI and vfGuard, two solutions that reduce the attack space of code-resue
attacks by enforcing precise CFI models. However, over time, attacks have evolved and are
now capable of defeating most state-of-the-art solutions. In our final solution presented in
this dissertation, we present Stack-Pointer Integrity as a novel program integrity model.
We approach the problem from the perspective of stack-pointer, which assumes the role of
a program counter (as opposed to instruction pointer) during a code-reuse attack. While

3
SPI further reduces the attack space, it provides even stronger security in combination
with CFI. We show that recovering function level semantics and C++ level semantics can
improve the precision by 99.473% and 99.999% respectively.
In order to enforce the generated policy, we discuss three enforcement models. First,
Total-CFI uses whole system monitoring wherein all the processes in the system are
simultaneously monitored for violations. Second, vfGuard uses process level emulation,
where policies are enforced by emulating each process separately. Finally, in SPI, we use
binary instrumentation to modify a binary to embed the security primitives within the
binary. We show that SPI can defend against inter-stack pivoting with a small overhead of
1%.

1.2

Our Thesis

Recovering high-level semantics from the binary can aid in reducing the attack space in
code-reuse attacks. Enforcing the integrity of stack pointer further reduces the attack space.

1.3

Dissertation Organization

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides the
high-level background essential in understanding this dissertation. Chapter 3 presents three
policy generation solutions Total-CFI, vfGuard and SPI that successively decrease attack
space. Chapter 4 presents three enforcement models. Chapter 5 discusses the limitations of
this thesis and future work, and finally Chapter 6 concludes.
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2. BACKGROUND
This section gives a survey of state-of-the-art in attacks and defenses on the binary, and
program integrity models. The section ends with shortcomings of the practical
implementations of the integrity models, which forms the basis for this dissertation.

2.1

Binary-Level Attacks

Binary-level attacks alter the target program’s control data (e.g., function pointer,
return address) directly in the memory in order to achieve arbitrary code execution. With
the advent of hardware mechanisms that prevent data execution (e.g., DEP, NX), attackers
can no longer execute the injected code after exploiting the vulnerability. Therefore,
attacks that reuse existing code – known as code-reuse attacks – are on a rise. Particularly,
Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) [7] gleans short code fragments terminated by ret
instruction (or more broadly, an indirect branch instruction) called “gadgets” from
executable sections of program code, and chains such gadgets to perform meaningful
malicious tasks. In a seminal paper, Shacham [7] showed that ROP is turing complete.
Since, several real world attacks employ ROP to bypass DEP. ROP as an attack mechanism
is so popular and mature that there exist tools to automatically extract gadgets [8] from
programs and compile them [9] (i.e., chain them) to implement program logic.
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More recently, Carlini and Wagner [10], and Göktaş et al. [11], demonstrate practical
attacks that reuse code fragments that span several instructions, sometimes entire
functions. Such attacks not only bring the traditional definition of a gadget into question,
but also highlight that defenses lack precision.

2.2

Binary-Level Defenses against Code-Reuse Attacks

2.2.1

Artificial Diversification

The goal of artificial diversity is to randomize and hide the location of a program’s
code, data, stack, heap, etc [12–16]. STIR [17] performs static instrumentation to generate
binaries that self-randomize every time the binary is loaded. Isomeron [18], combines code
randomization with execution-path randomization, wherein code fragments that can be
indirectly targeted are duplicated, and at runtime, a randomly chosen fragment from the
duplicates is invoked. Xu and Chapin [19] [15] provide intra-modular ASLR using
code-islands in order to defend against chained return-to-libc attacks, wherein they identify
and randomize into isolated code blocks. That is, they not only randomize the base
addresses of memory mappings, but also randomize the relative offsets between each
functions.
Artificial-diversity-based defenses are fundamentally susceptible to disclosure attacks,
and are not always an effective defense [20]. Moreover, they are also susceptible in cases
where an attacker introduces the code (with predictable layout) that s/he can reuse [21].

6
2.2.2

Gadget Elimination

Two main works: in-place code randomization [22]and G-Free [23] have been proposed
to eliminate gadgets. G-Free is a compiler extension that compiles the source-code to
generate gadget-free binaries. Pappas et al. [22] operate directly on the binary by first
identifying the gadgets, and then eliminating them by performing in-place
semantic-preserving modifications. Fundamentally, these solutions suffer from two
limitations:
1. Weak Definition of Gadget: Per these solutions, a short sequence of instructions
terminated by a ret instruction is treated as a gadget. However, in principle, a
sequence of instructions of any length can be used as a gadget as long as the attacker
can negate the undesirable side effects of using a gadget by using appropriate
compensatory gadgets.
2. Lack of Coverage: Due to their intrusive nature, and the large number of gadgets
to eliminate [7], they can only eliminate a fraction of all the gadgets in the binary.
For example, Pappas et al. [22] eliminate 76.9% gadgets in Windows XP and 7,
leaving an attacker with 23.1% or 6.3M gadgets to take advantage of.

2.2.3

Control-Flow Integrity

Control-flow integrity (CFI) was first proposed by Abadi et al. in 2005 [24] as part of
the compiler framework to automatically place in-line reference monitors in the emitted
binary code to ensure the legitimacy of control transfers. CFI as a program property
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dictates that software execution must follow a path of a Control-Flow Graph [25]
determined ahead of time. Since then, a great deal of research efforts have built on top of
it. Some efforts extended the compiler framework to provide better CFI protection.

Compile-Time Defenses MCFI [26] enables a concept of modular control flow integrity
by supporting separating compilation. KCoFI [27] provides control flow integrity for
commodity operating system kernels. RockJIT [28] aims to provide control flow integrity
for JIT compilers.
Other efforts are made to enforce control-flow integrity directly on binary code. Efforts
such as PittSFIeld [29] and CCFIR [30] enforce coarse-grained policy by aligning code.
Based on a CPU emulator, MoCFI [31] rewrites ARM binary code to retrofit CFI
protection on smart phone. While Opaque CFI [32] combines coarse-grained CFI and
artificial diversification in order to render disclosure attacks harder, it introduces other
problems like large space overhead, lack of fine-grained diversification, etc.
Several solutions have also been proposed at a source-code level [4, 6]. Lhee and
Chapin [33] associate type information with buffers during compile time in order to prevent
buffer overflows. Code-Pointer Integrity (CPI) [34] protect pointers to code, etc

Run-Time Defenses Runtime defenses monitor the execution during run time, and
identify anomalies in the control flow. Xu and Chapin [35] generate and validate a policy
that captures the legitimate control flows leading up to each system call. More recently,
kBouncer [36] and ROPecker [37] periodically examine the control flow to detect anomalies.
Particularly, they associate heuristics to “gadgets”, and by examining the “Last Branch
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Record” (LBR) – a hardware feature provided by the Intel CPU, they identify potential
attacks. All of these defenses have been defeated by the attacks proposed in [10] and [38].
Further, PointerScope [39] performs exploit diagnosis by automatically inferring and
detecting type violations during execution. As a runtime diagnosis system, it imposes
severe performance overhead.

2.3

Shortcomings of Current Binary-Level Defenses

Shortcomings of state-of-the-art binary-level defenses against code-reuse attacks are
tabulated in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Shortcomings of current binary-level defenses against code-reuse attacks
Category
(Representative
Solution)

Parameter

Status

Reason

Precision

Low
Not incrementally deployable,
Requires a priori knowledge
of vulnerable process

Approximate CFG

> 8%

Approximate CFG

CFI

Deploy-ability

(BinCFI [40])

Runtime
Performance
overhead

Artificial Diversity
ASLR [41]

Gadget Elimination
(G-Free [23])

Gadget
Definition

Weak

Resilience

Partial

Diversification

Partial

Coverage

Low

Incomplete CFG

Does not support large,
function-entry, or
call-preceded
gadgets
Vulnerable to
memory disclosure
attacks and Just-in-time
injected gadgets
In practice,
not all modules
are diversified.
Too many gadgets
to eliminate
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2.3.1

Precision

Binary-level CFI-based defenses (e.g., BinCFI [40], CCFIR [30]) suffer from low
precision due to their coarse-grained nature. Without source code, these solutions take a
conservative approach and include redundant edges in the CFG, which leads to an
exploitable attack space. Practical attacks against such defenses were demonstrated by
Carline and Wagner [10], and Göktaş et al. [11].

2.3.2

Deployment

Module-Level Deployment Key to CFI-based defenses is that they rely on recovering
the CFG of the program. However, when a module is compiled, it may not be possible to
ascertain all the other modules that would be using the module. This leads to the
incomplete CFG problem. Due to this problem, modules can not be selectively protected
unless all the modules that are used by a program are protected.
Some solutions [26] have been proposed to extend the CFG, and hence the CFI
protection at runtime, however, these solutions require changes to the loader, which may
not always be possible.

Sytem-Wide Deployment In order to defend against attacks in a performance-efficient
manner, runtime CFI-based defenses must know the precise processes to monitor. However,
vulnerabilities could exist in multiple modules spanning multiple processes. This leads to a
scalability problem wherein, CFI-based runtime defenses can not scale with the running
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processes in the system. This is particularly important to defend against complex malware
like Stuxnet [3] that exploit multiple vulnerabilities in across the system.
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3. ATTACK SPACE REDUCTION
In this chapter, we describe each of the three solutions that propose stringent models in
order to reduce the attack space.

3.1

Precise CFI Model through Recovery of Function Semantics

There are several challenges to enforce CFI in practice. The key challenge is that CFI
requires a complete control-flow graph (CFG), which is hard to compute without source
code. In this section, we present Total-CFI, a tool that recovers function-level semantics
from a binary in order to improve the precision of CFI policy [42].

3.1.1

Total-CFI Overview

Total-CFI leverages full system emulation to monitor the guest operating system from
its inception. Schematic overview of Total-CFI can be found in Figure 3.1. At a high level,
Total-CFI consists of 2 components, Policy Generation and Policy Enforcement. In this
chapter, we confine the scope to policy generation, we discuss policy enforcement in
Chapter 4.

Model Generation The model generated by Total-CFI consists of a static and a
dynamic component. The static policy comprises of a whitelist that succinctly captures all
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Fig. 3.1.: Architecture Overview of Total-CFI

the allowable targets for indirect call/jmp instructions. A whitelist for a specific module is
made up of all the statically determinable target addresses for indirect control flow in the
module, such as the elements of relocation table and the export table. A whitelist for a
process is a union of all the whitelists of all the modules loaded in the process address
space. Whereas the dynamic or the runtime component of the policy intercepts each call
and ret instructions. The policy requires that each ret instruction return to an
instruction succeeding the previously executed call instruction.

3.1.2

Static Policy

Exploits alter the normal control flow by manipulating the derived code addresses (e.g.,
function pointers). Total-CFI’s CFI model is based on the observation that most of the
control flow is restricted by a pre-determined subset of code that forms the entry point of
branch targets. For example, targets of call, jmp instructions must adhere to the
statically determined call graph, and can not branch to any arbitrary location. Based on
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this observation, a program is statically analyzed to generate a whitelist, a list of allowable
targets for each indirect call/jmp instruction.

Target Whitelist The addresses within the relocation table and the export table of the
binary constitute the module whitelist. With compatibility in mind, most modern binaries
are compiled to be relocatable [43]. When the loader cannot load a binary at its default
location, it performs relocation. The loader refers to the relocation table and fixes the
addresses of the entries in the relocation table. Indirectly addressable code must be
relocatable. Similarly, export table contains the functions that a given module exposes for
use by other modules. Addresses of such functions are resolved at runtime based on the
actual load address of the dependent modules. Therefore entries of the relocation table and
the export table of a module together form valid indirect branch targets for a module.
Irrespective of the guest OS being executed, the loader first needs to load the entire
module binary to memory and perform relocation fix-ups (if any) before transferring
control to the module. However, when the control reaches the module entry, it is possible
that the guest OS memory manager has flushed the page containing the relocation table
from the memory. To optimize the whitelist extraction, Total-CFI first tries to retrieve the
relocation and export tables corresponding to a module directly from the guest memory. If
the pages corresponding to relocation and export table are paged out, Total-CFI accesses
the binary file corresponding to the module on the guest file system and extracts the
relocation table and export table from the binary.
For each process in the system, Total-CFI maintains a sorted array of loaded modules
in the process address space. It also maintains a hashtable that maps the base address of a
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module to the whitelist corresponding to the module. When a module is loaded,
Total-CFI first checks the whitelist cache for the whitelist corresponding to the module,
only if the whitelist is not present, it constructs the whitelist for the module and adds the
whitelist to the whitelist cache.
When Total-CFI encounters an indirect call or jmp instruction, it performs a binary
search for the target address in the loaded modules array of the process. Here, the binary
search returns a negative insertion point if the search failed. If the returned search value is
an even negative index, then the target address does not belong to any of the modules and
is treated as a violation of CFI model. However, if the return value is an odd negative
index, the target address belongs to the module with base address equal to the address at
index - 1 in the loaded module array. Note that it is not possible for the return value to be
positive since the target address cannot be equal to the start address or the end address of
a module. Therefore, if the return value is non-negative, the address is considered not to
be present.
The whitelist lookup is performed with a time complexity of lg(n), where n is the
number of modules in the process address space. Although maintaining a single hash-table
for each process with all the whitelists corresponding to all the modules in its address space
will suffice, such an approach leads to severe memory overhead due to redundancies,
because several common modules (like NTDLL.DLL, KERNEL32.DLL, etc.) will be
present in every process whitelist.

Whitelist caching The whitelist for a binary is statically determined and therefore
remains the same across different execution instances. As an optimization, the whitelist is
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generated only once per binary file and the generated whitelist is stored in the whitelist
cache as a [file’s md5 checksum, whitelist] pair. When a new file is loaded, as an
optimization, Total-CFI first checks the whitelist cache to determine if the whitelist has
already been extracted, only if the file is being encountered for the first time, Total-CFI
extracts the whitelist and adds the whitelist to the whitelist cache.

3.1.3

Dynamic Policy

Runtime model for CFI enforcement in Total-CFI is based on the fact that a ret
instruction must return to an address succeeding a call instruction that was previously
encountered.
Total-CFI maintains two shadow call stacks per executing thread in the system. One
stack shadows the user level stack of the thread and the other shadows the kernel level
stack. Whenever a call instruction is encountered, Total-CFI pushes the return address
to the corresponding shadow stack (kernel level shadow stack if operating in kernel mode
and user level shadow stack if operating in user mode) of the currently executing thread.
When a ret instruction is encountered, Total-CFI pops the target address of the
return instruction from the appropriate stack of the currently executing thread. If the
target address is not found on the shadow stack and the target address does not belong to
dynamically generated code, Total-CFI infers the ret instruction to be a part of a
potential exploit.

Shadow Call Stack To keep track of the call-ret pairs during the execution of a
thread in the guest OS, Total-CFI maintains two shadow call stacks per thread - one for
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void foo(int i)
{
if(i == 5)
throw 18;
return 0;
}

int main()
{
int i = 0;
cout << "Enter a no: "<<endl;
cin >> i;
try
{
foo(i);
}
catch (int e)
{
if(e == 18)
i = 0;
cout << "Ex:" << e << endl;
}
return 0;
}

0047e820 <___cxa_throw>:
........................
47e9e6:
mov 0x4(%eax),%edx
47e9ee:
jmp *%edx
........................

Shadow Call Stack

//Retrieve address of catch
block (loc_0x401670) from
exception object, and jump

0040150c <__Z4foo2i>:
........................
401512:
cmpl $0x5,0x8(%ebp)
401516:
jne 40153f <__Z4fooi+0x33>
........................
401529:
movl $0x12,(%eax)
40153a:
call 47e820 <___cxa_throw>
40153f:
mov $0x0,%eax
........................
0040159c <_main>:
........................
4015c6:
mov loc_0x401670, %edx
4015cb:
mov %edx, 0x4(%eax)
........................
40163b:
call 40150c <__Z3fooi>
401640:
add $0x10,%esp
........................
401670:
mov %eax,-0x14(%ebp)
401673:
cmpl $0x12,-0x14(%ebp)
401677:
jne 401680 <_main+0xe4>
401679:
movl $0x0,-0x18(%ebp)
........................
401726:
ret
........................

(Stack grows upwards)

// if(i == 5)

// throw 18

2

40153f
401640

After 40153a:
call <_cxa_throw>

Return address of main

// Save address of catch
block in exception object

// foo(i)

1

401640
Return address of main

After 40163b:
call <_Z3fooi>

//callatch(int e) {
// if(e == 18)
//

i=0
3

After 401726: ret

Fig. 3.2.: Shadow Call Stack Behavior During a C++ Exception

user mode execution and one for kernel mode execution. When a call or ret instruction is
executed, the context is identified. The context constitutes the process, thread and the
user/kernel mode the instruction was executed in. From the context, Total-CFI identifies
the appropriate shadow call stack. Then, if the instruction is a call instruction, it pushes
the address of the succeeding instruction on to the identified shadow stack. Conversely, if
the instruction is a ret instruction, Total-CFI pops the target address off the shadow
stack. If the address is not present in the shadow stack, Total-CFI reports an exploit.
Though strict pairing between call-ret pairs account for a majority of control
transfers, there are certain special control transfers that make CFI enforcement via shadow
call stack monitoring challenging. Below, we consider such special control flow scenarios.
Handling of Exceptions: Exception handling is a mechanism to handle anomalous
events that often change the normal control flow of a program. Figure 3.2 describes the
handling of such exceptions by Total-CFI. Column 1 lists the source code of a program
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that raises and handles an exception. Column 2 lists the simplified version of the
corresponding code in assembly, obtained when the code is compiled using the
MinGW-g++ cross compiler. The exception handler or the catch block is relocatable and
hence appears as an entry in the relocation table. During compile time, the compiler stores
the address of such a block in the exception object. At runtime, when an exception is
thrown, the throw statement translates to a call to

cxa throw, which in turn retrieves the

address of the catch block from the exception object, rewinds the stack and transfers
control to the catch block via an indirect jump. Column 3 of Figure 3.2 shows the
contents of shadow stack at different stages during the program execution. On one hand,
during the jmp instruction, Total-CFI verifies that the branch address is a part of the
program’s whitelist and lets the instruction pass, but on the other hand, when the main
function returns (stage 4 in Column 3 of Figure 3.2), the Total-CFI recognizes that the
return address is not at the top of the shadow stack and therefore pops all the items up to
and including the return address of main function from the top of the stack.
Handling of setjmp/longjmp: In C and its flavors, setjmp and longjmp are used to save
and restore the CPU environment respectively, in order to transfer control to a
predetermined location. During setjmp, the environment including the contents of the
CPU registers are cached in a user provided buffer, and during longjmp, the CPU register
contents are restored from the buffer. Upon encountering a setjmp, Total-CFI records the
value of the program counter where the control will be transferred to during longjmp.
When a longjmp is encountered, Total-CFI verifies the target address to be the same as
the value of the program counter as recorded during the previous setjmp in the current
execution context. Mismatch in the target address is flagged as a potential exploit.
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Kernel mode to User mode call backs: Typically, the control transfers from user
mode to kernel mode happen through the sysenter and int instructions, and back from
kernel mode to user mode via sysexit and iret instructions respectively. However, in
Windows, NTDLL maintains a set of entry points that are used by the kernel to invoke
certain functionality on behalf of the user mode [44]. Some such NTDLL APIs are:
KiUserExceptionDispatcher, KiUserApcDispatcher, KiRaiseUserExceptionDispatcher and
KiUserCallbackDispatcher. They are used by the kernel as a trampoline to invoke
functionality in the user mode. Kernel saves the processor state and alters the thread stack
to accomplish such a call. When the kernel alters the execution of a thread and transitions
to user mode, the return address may not coincide with the expected return address at the
top of the stack. To address this problem, for every stack in the system, Total-CFI
maintains a hash-table wherein, for every ESP register value encountered during a call
instruction as key, it stores the position of the entry in the stack as value. When a return
instruction is encountered, it first checks the ESP register’s value in the hash-table to find
the position on the shadow stack and then, pops all the elements up to that position off the
stack. Such an approach is reasonable because, the stack is dictated primarily by the ESP
register and a rewind of the ESP register would imply a clean-up of the stack. If the ESP
register value is not found in the hash-table, the instruction is flagged as a potential exploit.

3.1.4

Dynamically Generated Code

The key challenge with dynamically generated code (e.g., JIT code), is that the code
can not be statically analyzed and therefore, the whitelists can not be generated.
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Execution of dynamically generated code portray the following characteristics:
(i) Firstly, the page containing the dynamically generated code must be written to
memory and made executable (particularly on DEP-enabled systems) before it is
executed.
(ii) Secondly, control transitions from non-dynamic to dynamic code follow a finite
pre-set path.
At runtime, Total-CFI tracks the entries in the code and the write caches of
Translation Lookup Buffer (TLB) of the CPU to identify dynamically generated code. If
an entry in the write cache of the TLB appears in the code cache of the TLB, the entry is
identified as dynamically generated code.
Initially, Total-CFI is trained to accumulate the possible control paths that lead to
dynamically generated code in a particular application. This is done by recording the
shadow stacks for the valid control flows that lead to dynamically generated code. An
intersection of such paths is used as a signature that is enforced during execution. Here, it
is possible that the dynamic code generation library is loaded at different locations on each
instance it is loaded. Therefore, Total-CFI maintains the signature as a [module:offset]
pair to validate across load instances.
During normal execution, when Total-CFI encounters a branch target that is not in
the whitelist, it first checks if the target belongs to dynamically generated code, next it
checks the shadow call stack to check if the shadow call stack satisfies the dynamic code
signature for the application.
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3.1.5

Non-relocatable binaries

Though most binaries are relocatable, some legacy code can be non-relocatable. In such
cases, Total-CFI statically analyzes the binaries to extract all the statically identifiable
addresses - the ones that either occur as constant address operands in the disassembly or
the ones that have a function prologue. Though this approach includes addresses which
may not be valid targets, such a conservative approach will reduce false positives.

3.1.6

Branch Tables or Jump Tables

A jump table is an array of function pointers or an array of machine code jump
instructions. Calls to the functions (or code blocks) in the array are made through indirect
addressing using the base address of the jump table and the offset of the desired code block
in the table. We make two key observations about jump tables:
1. The base address of a jump table must be relocatable and therefore contains an entry
in the relocation table.
2. Every entry in the jump table must point to a valid code block.
Total-CFI takes a liberal approach to handle jump tables. For every entry in the
relocation table, Total-CFI checks if the content at that address points to code, if so, it
treats it as a potential base address of a jump table. It traverses the table for consecutive
entries that point to code and adds them to the whitelist.
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00000a44 <foo>:
...................
a69: call 9a7<__i686.get_pc_thunk>
a6e: add $0x1586,%ebx //Offset of f()
a74: call *%ebx
...................
000009a7 <__i686.get_pc_thunk>:
9a7: mov (%esp),%ebx
9aa: ret

Fig. 3.3.: Position Independent Code

3.1.7

Position Independent Code (PIC)

The addressing in PIC does not rely on any particular position in the program address
space. Conceptually, PIC identifies the current value of Program Counter (PC) and
addresses different code blocks as offsets from the PC. Figure 3.3 shows a typical example
of PIC. The current version of Total-CFI does not support PIC, however it is possible to
parse the binary to scan for target address generation patterns. For example, Wartell et
al. [45] scan the binary to identify call instructions and perform simple data-flow analysis
to identify instructions that use the generated address in an arithmetic computation.

3.1.8

Security Analysis

Evading Total-CFI In this work, we address the attacks that arise due to control flow
violations. Most attacks in the wild are control hijacking attacks, where attacker executes
malicious payload by diverting control flow. However, there exist data only attacks [46] that
do not hijack control flow (e.g., bad system configuration resulting in unintended privilege
escalation). Such attacks are out of our scope. That said, works in the past [47–49] have
focussed on addressing data integrity concerns. There also exist techniques based on
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dynamic taint analysis [50–52] wherein, input data is marked as tainted and tracked
through memory to ensure that they do not end up in security critical data structures.
Total-CFI relies on integrity of kernel data to guarantee the correctness of perceived
events in the guest kernel. Since Total-CFI retrieves the data directly from the guest OS
kernel data structures, attacks that tamper with the kernel data will mislead Total-CFI.
Furthermore, non-control flow side channel attacks, data attacks [53, 54], physical
attacks and attacks that target the VMM are also out of Total-CFI’s scope. Attacks
against the VMM have been demonstrated in the past [55].

Exploits within whitelist

Total-CFI treats the entries in the whitelist as legal entries

for indirect branch operations. Therefore, all the function entry points (such as libc
functions) belong to the whitelist. This gives rise to a possibility for an attacker to craft an
attack such that the jump/call target is an entry within the whitelist. Currently,
Total-CFI is vulnerable to such jump-or-call-to-libc type of attacks. Note that
return-to-libc will be captured by Total-CFI due to the violation in the shadow call stack.

3.1.9

Summary

Total-CFI [42] recovers the function-level semantics, specifically function entry points,
in order to improve the precision of CFI policy. In comparison with DEP-only defense,
Total-CFI provides much stronger protection, and can detect all tested exploits. Moreover,
due to a system-wide nature of deployment, Total-CFI can provide whole system CFI
protection.
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3.2

Precise CFI Model through Recovery of C++ Semantics

While Total-CFI and other coarse-grained CFI solutions [30] [40] have significantly
reduced the attack surface, recent efforts by Göktaş et al. [11] and Carlini [10] have
demonstrated that coarse-grained CFI solutions are too permissive, and can be bypassed
by reusing large gadgets whose starting addresses are allowed by coarse-grained solutions.
We argue that the primary reason for such permissiveness is the lack of high-level program
semantics that introduce certain mandates on the control flow. For example, given a class
inheritance, target of a virtual function dispatch in C++ must be a virtual function that
the dispatching object is allowed to invoke. Similarly, target of an exception dispatch must
be one of the legitimate exception handlers. Accounting for control flow restrictions
imposed at higher levels of semantics improves the precision of CFI.
In this work, we recover C++-level semantics to generate more precise CFI policies for
dynamic dispatches in C++ binaries. We set our focus on C++ binaries because, due to
its object-oriented programming paradigm and high efficiency as compared to other
object-oriented languages like Java, it is prevalent in many complex software programs. To
support polymorphism, C++ employs a dynamic dispatch mechanism. Dynamic dispatches
are predominant in C++ binaries and are executed using an indirect call instruction. For
instance, in a large C++ binary like libmozjs.so (Firefox’s Spidermonkey Javascript
engine), 84.6% indirect function calls are dynamic dispatches. For a given C++ binary, we
aim to construct sound and precise CFI policy for dynamic dispatches in order to reduce
the space for code-reuse attacks.
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Constructing a strict CFI policy directly from C++ binaries is a challenging task. A
strict CFI policy should not miss any legitimate virtual call targets to ensure zero false
alarms, and should exclude as many impossible virtual call targets as possible to reduce the
attack space. In order to protect real-world binaries, all these need to be accomplished
under the assumption that only the binary code (without any symbol or debug
information) is available. In order to construct a strict CFI policy for virtual calls, we need
to reliably rebuild certain C++-level semantics that persist in the stripped C++ binaries,
particularly VTables and virtual callsites. Based on the extracted VTables and callsites, we
can construct a basic CFI policy and further refine it. As a key contribution, we
demonstrate that CFI policies with increased precision can be constructed by recovering
C++-level semantics. While the refined policies may not completely eliminate code-reuse
attacks, by reducing the number of available gadgets, it makes attacks harder to execute.
A complete version of the paper is available [56].

3.2.1

Polymorphism in C++ Binary

In C++, functions declared with keyword “virtual” are termed “virtual functions” [57]
and their invocation is termed “virtual call” (or vcall). Virtual functions are in the heart of
polymorphism, which allows a derived class to override methods in its base class. When a
virtual function that is overridden in a derived class is invoked on an object, the invoked
function depends on the object’s type at runtime. Modern compilers – e.g., Microsoft
Visual C++ (MSVC) and GNU g++ – achieve this resolution using a “Virtual Function
Table” or VTable, a table that contains an array of “virtual function pointers” (vfptr) –
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pointers to virtual functions. Itanium [58] and MSVC [59] are two of the most popular
C++ ABIs that dictate the implementation of various C++ language semantics.

Objects and VTables An object contains various instance variables along with the
vptr. Due to its frequent use, modern compilers place vptr as the first entry within the
object. The vptr is followed by the member variables of the class. The location in the
VTable where the vptr points to is called the “address point”. The first vfptr in the
VTable is stored at the address point.
In addition to an array of virtual function pointers, a VTable also holds optional
information at negative offsets from address point. Optional information includes Run
Time Type Information (RTTI) and various offset fields required to adjust the this pointer
at runtime. We refer readers to [58] for more information on RTTI and various offset fields.
During compilation, all the VTables used by a module are placed in a read-only section of
the executable. Furthermore, a hidden field called “virtual table pointer” (vptr) – a pointer
to the VTable – is inserted into objects of classes that either directly define virtual
functions or inherit from classes that define virtual functions. Under normal circumstances,
the vptr is typically initialized during construction of the object.

Virtual Call Dispatch Irrespective of the compiler optimizations and the ABI, a
virtual call dispatch comprises of the following 5 steps:
GetVT Dereference the vptr of the object (this pointer) to obtain the VTable.
GetVF Dereference (VTable + offset) to retrieve the vfptr to the method being invoked.
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SetArg Set the arguments to the function on the stack or in the registers depending on
the calling convention.
SetThis Set the implicit this pointer either on stack or in ecx register depending on the
calling convention.
CallVF Invoke the vfptr using an indirect call instruction.
GetVT, GetVF, SetThis and CallVF are required steps in all vcalls, whereas depending on
if the callee function accepts arguments or not, SetArg is optional. Though there is no
restriction with respect to relative ordering of the steps followed, some steps are implicitly
dependent on others (e.g., GetVF must occur after GetVT).

3.2.2

Problem Statement, Assumptions and Scope

Problem Statement Given a C++ binary, we aim to construct a CFI policy to protect
its virtual function calls (or dynamic dispatches). Specifically, for each virtual callsite in
the binary, we need to collect a whitelist of legitimate call targets. If a call target beyond
the whitelist is observed during the execution of the C++ binary, we treat it as a violation
against our CFI policy and stop the program execution.
More formally, this CFI policy can be considered as a function:

P = C → 2F ,

where C denotes all virtual function call sites and F all legitimate call targets inside the
given C++ binary. Therefore, as a power set of F, 2F denotes a space of all subsets of F.
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Furthermore, we define callsite c ∈ C to be a 2-tuple, c = (displacement, offset) with
displacement from the base of the binary to the callsite and the VTable offset at the callsite.
A good CFI policy must be sound and as precise as possible. The existing binary-only
CFI solutions (e.g., BinCFI, CCFIR, etc.) ensure soundness, but are imprecise, and
therefore expose considerable attack space to sophisticated code-reuse attacks [11].
Therefore, to provide strong protection for virtual function calls in C++ binaries, our CFI
policy must be sound, and at the same time, be more precise than the existing binary-only
CFI protections.
To measure the precision, we can use source-code based solutions as reference systems.
With source code, these solutions can precisely identify the virtual dispatch callsites and
the class inheritance hierarchy within the program. Then, at each callsite, they insert
checks to ensure that (1) the VTable used to make the call is compatible with the type of
the object making the call [6] or (2) the call target belongs to a set of polymorphic
functions extracted from the inheritance tree for the type of object making the call [4].

Assumptions and Scope Since we target COTS C++ binaries, we must assume that
none of source code, symbol information, debugging information, RTTI, etc. is available.
We must also deal with challenges arising due to compiler optimizations that blur and
remove C++ semantic information during compilation. In other words, we must rely on
strong C++ semantics that are dictated by C++ ABIs and persist during the process of
code compilation and optimization. Due to the reliance on standard ABIs, we only target
C++ binaries that are compiled using standard C++ compilers (e.g., MSVC and GNU
g++). Custom compilers that do not adhere to Itanium and MSVC ABIs are out of scope.
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Fig. 3.4.: Overview of vfGuard

Moreover, since our goal is to protect benign C++ binaries, code obfuscation techniques
that deliberately attempt to evade and confuse our defense are also out of our scope.
Furthermore, our goal is to protect virtual function calls and their manifestations
through indirect call instructions in the binary. We do not aim to protect indirect jmp or
ret instructions. However, we aim to provide a solution orthogonal to existing solutions
(e.g., shadow call stack [60], coarse-grained CFI [30, 40]) so as to provide a more complete
and accurate CFI.

3.2.3

Approach Overview

In order to tackle the problem stated in Section 3.2.2, we must leverage the C++ ABIs
to recover strong C++ semantics that persist in a given C++ binary. First of all, we need
to accurately discover virtual callsites C in the binary. Then, we need to identify all the
virtual function entry points, which form the legitimate call targets F. Because all
functions in F are polymorphic (virtual), and must exist in VTables, we must identify all
the VTables in the binary. After having identified virtual callsites and VTables, we can
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construct a basic policy such that, for each callsite the legitimate targets include all the
functions in the VTables at the given offset. This basic policy is already more precise than
Total-CFI and other state-of-the-art CFI defenses – CCFIR and BinCFI. To further
improve the policy precision, we propose two additional filters to reduce this set of
legitimate targets.
Figure 3.4 presents the overview of our solution. We have implemented our solution in a
tool called vfGuard. Given a C++ binary, vfGuard will extract virtual callsites in the
“Callsite Identification” component, and VTables in the “VTable Identification”
component. With the extracted callsites and the VTables, the “Target Accumulation”
component accumulates all the functions from the VTables that individual callsites can
target. Finally, “Target Filtering” filters the targets to obtain a more precise policy. The
generated policy can be enforced using one of several ways discussed in Chapter 4.

3.2.4

Callsite Identification

Challenges The key challenge in identifying the callsites is to differentiate legitimate
callsites from other indirect call instructions. C++ binary is often mixed with non-C++
code components written in C, assembly language, etc. These code components could be
included from a dependent library or could be injected by the compiler for exception
handling, runtime binding, etc. While the steps enumerated in Section 3.2.1 provide a good
starting point to look for callsites within a binary, they present some hard challenges.

• Some steps are independent of the other and therefore follow no strict ordering – e.g.,
SetArg and SetThis may occur before GetVT and GetVF.
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• GetVT through CallVF may span multiple basic blocks – e.g., when two or more
virtual calls are dispatched in multiple branches on the same this pointer, a compiler
may move some steps to a basic block that dominates the blocks that performs the
calls.
• Some steps may be implicit. For example, in functions that employ thiscall
convention, an incoming object pointer may be retained in the ecx register
throughout the function thereby eliminating the need for an explicit SetThis for
virtual calls on the same object.
• GetVF resembles a simple dereference if offset is 0. This bears close resemblance to a
double dereference of a function pointer in C code. To ensure soundness in our policy
generation, we cannot afford to include false virtual callsites.

To address all the above challenges, we take a principled approach and perform static
and flow-sensitive intra-procedural data flow analysis on an intermediate representation of
the binary.

Intra-Procedural Static Analysis Due to the complex nature of x86 binaries and the
complexities involved in recovering the callsites, a simple scanning-based approach for
callsite identification is insufficient. vfGuard first identifies all the candidate functions that
could host callsites by identifying functions in the binary that contain at least 1 indirect
call instruction. Each identified function is subjected to static intra-procedural analysis to
identify legitimate virtual callsites and VTable offsets at such callsites. In order to perform
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f unction
stmt

::=
::=

exp
♦b
♦u
var
τreg
τval

::=
::=
::=
::=
::=
::=

(stmt)∗
var ::= exp | exp ::= exp | goto exp
| call exp | return
| if var then stmt
exp ♦b exp | ♦u exp | var
=, +, −, ∗, /, ...
deref, −, ∼
τreg | τval
reg1 t|reg8 t|reg16 t|reg32 t
{Integer }

Table 3.1: Intermediate Language used by vfGuard

the data flow analysis, we modified an open source C decompiler [61]. Below, we present
the different steps in our analysis.
IR Transformation and SSA Form: x86 instruction set is large, and instructions often have
complex semantics. To aid in analysis and focus on the data flow, we make use of a simple,
yet intuitive intermediate language as shown in Table 3.1. The IR is simple enough to
precisely capture the flow of data within a function without introducing unnecessary
overhead. Each function is first broken down into basic blocks and a control-flow graph
(CFG) is generated. Then, starting from the function entry point, the basic blocks are
traversed in a depth-first fashion and each assembly instruction is converted into one or
more IR statements. A statement comprises of expressions, which at any point is a
symbolic representation of data within a variable. A special unary operator called deref
represents the dereference operation. goto, call and return instructions are retained
with similar semantic interpretations as their x86 counterparts. Edges between basic blocks
in the CFG is captured using goto.
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In its current form, vfGuard supports registers up to 32 bits in size, however, the
technique itself is flexible and can be easily extended to support 64-bit registers. Moreover,
note that the ABIs are not restricted to any particular hardware architecture. Performing
analysis on the IR facilitates our solution to be readily ported to protect C++ binaries on
other architectures (e.g., ARM) by simply translating the instructions to IR.
Furthermore, we convert each IR statement into Single Static Assignment (SSA) [25, 62]
form, which has some unique advantages. IR in SSA form readily provides the def-use and
the use-def chains for various variables and expressions in the IR.
Def-Use Propagation: The definition of each SSA variable and list of statements that use
them constitutes the Def-Use chains [25]. vfGuard recursively propagates the definitions
into uses until all the statements are comprised of entry point definitions (i.e., function
arguments, input registers and globals). Due to flow-sensitive nature of our analysis, it is
possible that upon propagation, we end up with multiple expressions for each SSA variable,
and each expression represents a particular code path. For example, consider the code
snippet:

...
1.

A *pa; A a; C c;

2.

if (x == 0)

3.
4.

pa = &a
else

5.

pa = &c

6.

pa->vAtest(0);
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...
At line 6, depending on the value of x, the vfptr corresponding to vAtest could either
be &(&(&c)+0x14) or &(&(&a)+0x14). Assuming stdcall convention, per step SetThis,
the implicit object pointer could either be &c or &a. Precise data flow analysis should
capture both possibilities, and for each case ensure the existence of a corresponding this
pointer assignment on the stack. For such cases, vfGuard creates multiple copies of the
statement – one for each propagated expression.
Subsequently, each definition is recursively propagated to the uses until a fixed point is
reached. At each instance of propagation, the resulting expression is simplified through
constant propagation. For example, deref ((ecx0 + c1 ) + c2 ) becomes deref (ecx0 + c3 )
where c3 = c1 + c2 .
Address
0x798
0x799
0x79b
0x79e
0x7a1
0x7a3
0x7a6
0x7a8
0x7ab
0x7ae

Instruction
push ebp
mov
sub
mov
mov
add
mov
mov
mov
call

ebp, esp
esp, 0x18h
eax, [ebp + 8]
eax, [eax]
eax, 8
eax, [eax]
edx, [ebp + 8]
[esp], edx
eax

IR-SSA form
deref (esp0 ) = ebp0
esp1 = esp0 − 4
ebp1 = esp1
esp2 = esp1 − 0x18
eax0 = deref (ebp1 + 8)
eax1 = deref (eax0 )
eax2 = eax1 + 8
eax3 = deref (eax2 )
edx0 = deref (ebp1 + 8)
deref (esp2 ) = edx0
call eax3

After Propagation and Constant Folding
deref (esp0 ) = ebp0
esp1 = esp0 − 4
ebp1 = esp0 − 4
esp2 = esp0 − 0x1C
eax0 = deref (esp0 + 4)
eax1 = deref (deref (esp0 + 4))
eax2 = deref (deref (esp0 + 4)) + 8
eax3 = deref (deref (deref (esp0 + 4)) + 8)
edx0 = deref (esp0 + 4)
deref (esp2 ) = deref (esp0 + 4)
call deref (deref (deref (esp0 + 4)) + 8)

Table 3.2: Static information flow analysis to identify a callsite

Callsite Labeling As per the steps involved in dynamic dispatch, we need to capture
GetVT through CallVF using static data flow analysis. More specifically, for each indirect
call, we compute expressions for the call target and expressions for this pointer passed to
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the target function. Note that due to flow-sensitive data flow analysis, we may end up
having multiple expressions for each statement or variable.
For a virtual callsite, after def-use propagation, its call instruction must be in one of the
two forms:
call deref (deref (exp) + τval )

(3.1)

call deref (deref (exp))

(3.2)

or

In the first form, exp as an expression refers to the vptr within an C++ object and τval
as a constant integer holds the VTable offset. When a virtual callsite invokes a virtual
function at offset 0 within the VTable, the call instruction will appear in the second form,
which is a double dereference of vptr. Here, τval is the byte offset within the VTable and
must be divisible by the pointer size. Therefore, if τval is not divisible by 4, the callsite is
discarded.
Next, we need to compute an expression for this pointer at the callsite. this pointer can
be either passed through ecx in thiscall or pushed onto the stack as the first argument in
stdcall conventions. Expression for this pointer must be identical to the exp within the
form (1) or (2).
Table 3.2 presents a concrete example. At 0x7ae, after propagation and simplification,
the call instruction matches with form (1) and we determine the expression for this pointer
to be deref (esp0 + 4) and VTable offset as 8. Then at 0x7ab, we determine that the first
argument pushed on the stack is also deref (esp0 + 4). Now, we are certain that this callsite
is indeed a virtual callsite, and it uses stdcall calling convention.
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Effect of Inheritance on Virtual Callsites: It is worth noting that our technique is
independent of the inheritance structure and works not only for single inheritance, but also
multiple and virtual inheritances. This is because the compiler adjusts this pointer at the
callsite to point to appropriate base object before the virtual function call is invoked.
Therefore, while the expression for this pointer may vary, it must be of the form (1) or (2)
above. Our method aims to resolve this pointer directly for each callsite, and thus can deal
with all these cases.

3.2.5

VTable Identification

Challenges Reconstructing precise inheritance tree from the binary is ideal but hard.
For instance, Dewey et al. [63] locate the constructors in the program by tracking the
VTable initializations. In commercial software, constructors are often inlined, therefore
such an approach would not yield a complete set of VTables that we seek. Other
approaches use heuristics that are not only dependent on debug information, but also
tailored for specific compilers like MSVC (e.g., IDA VTBL plugin [64]).
We propose an ABI-centric algorithm that can effectively recover all the VTables in a
binary in both MSVC and Itanium ABIs. We make the following key observations:

Ob1: VTables are present in the read-only sections of the binary.
Ob2: Offset of vfptr within a VTable is a constant and is statically determinable at the
invocation callsite.
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Ob3: Since the caller must pass the this pointer, any two polymorphic functions must
adhere to the same calling convention.
Based on Ob1, we scan the read-only sections in the binary to identify the VTables.
The VTables that adhere to Itanium ABI contain mandatory fields along with the array of
vfpts. The mandatory fields make locating of VTables in the binary relatively easier when
compared to MSVC ABI. However, VTables generated by the Microsoft Visual Studio
compiler (MSVC ABI) are often grouped together with no apparent “gap” between them.
This poses a challenge to accurately identify VTable boundaries.
Furthermore, according to Ob2, we first scan the code and data sections and identify
all the “immediate” values. Then, we check each value for a valid VTable address point. A
valid VTable contains an array of one or more vfptrs starting from the address point. It is
possible that our algorithm identifies non-VTables – e.g., function tables that resemble
VTables – as genuine VTables. We err on the safe side, because including a few false
VTables does not compromise the policy soundness and only reduces precision to a certain
degree. A detailed algorithm for VTable identification is presented below.

VTable Scanning Algorithm The algorithm used to identify VTables is presented in
Algorithm 1. It comprises of two functions. “ScanVTables” takes a binary as input and
returns a list of all the VTables V in the binary. Each instruction in the code sections and
each address in the data sections of the binary are scanned for immediate values. If an
immediate value that belongs to a read-only section of the binary is encountered, it is
checked for validity using “getVTable” and V is updated accordingly. “getVTable” checks
and returns the VTable at a given address. Starting from the address, it accumulates
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entries as valid vfptrs as long as they point to a valid instruction boundary within the code
region. Note that not all valid vfptrs may point to a function entry point. For instance, in
case of “pure virtual” functions, the vfptr points to a compiler generated stub that jumps
to a predefined location. In fact the MSVC compiler introduces stubs consisting of a single
return instruction to implement empty functions. To be conservative, vfGuard allows a
vfptr to point to any valid instruction in the code segments. Upon failure, it returns the
accumulated list of vfptrs as the VTable entries. If no valid vfptrs are found, an empty set
– signifying invalid VTable address point – is returned.
Furthermore, the following restriction is imposed on Itanium ABI: A valid VTable in
the Itanium ABI must have valid RTTI and “OffsetToTop” fields at negative offsets from
the address point. The RTTI field is either 0 or points to a valid RTTI structure. Similarly,
“OffsetToTop” must also have a sane value. A value -0xffffff ≤ offset ≤ 0xffffff, which
corresponds to an offset of 10M within an object, was empirically found to be sufficient.
Depending on the specific classes and inheritance, fields like “vbaseOffset” and
“vcallOffset” may be present in the VTable. To be conservative, we do not rely on such
optional fields. However with stronger analysis and object layout recovery, these
restrictions can be leveraged for more precise VTable discovery.
While vfGuard may identify some false VTables as legitimate, its conservative approach
does not miss a legitimate VTable, which is a core requirement to avoid false positives
during enforcement. Moreover, Algorithm 1 is not very effective at detecting end points of
the VTables in the binary. Pruning the VTables based on neighboring VTable start
addresses could lead to unsound policies if the neighboring VTables are not legitimate.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm to scan for VTables.
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:
29:
30:

procedure getVTable(Addr)
Vmethods ← ∅
if (ABIItanium and isM andatoryF ieldsV alid(Addr)) or ABIM SV C then
M ← [Addr]
while isV alidAddrInCode(M ) do
Vmethods ← Vmethods ∪ M
Addr ← Addr + size(P T R)
M ← [Addr]
end while
end if
return Vmethods
end procedure
procedure ScanVTables(Bin)
V←∅
for each Insn ∈ Bin.code do
if Insn contains ImmediateV al then
C ← immV alAt(Insn)
if C ∈ SectionRO and getV T able(C) 6= ∅ then
V ←V ∪C
end if
end if
end for
for each Addr ∈ Bin.data do
if [Addr] ∈ SectionRO and getV T able([Addr]) 6= ∅ then
V ← V ∪ [Addr]
end if
end for
return V
end procedure

While our approach reduces precision, it keeps the policy sound. Our algorithm terminates
a VTable when the vfptr is an invalid code pointer.
While Itanium ABI provides strong signatures for VTables due to mandatory offsets,
MSVC ABI does not. In theory, any pointer to code can be classified as a VTable under
MSVC ABI. In practice however, we found that legitimate VTables contain at least 2 or
more entries. Therefore, under MSVC ABI, we consider VTables only if they contain at
least 2 entries.
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3.2.6

Target Accumulation and Filtering

All the vfptrs and thunks within all the VTables together form a universal set for
virtual call targets. A naive policy will include all vfptrs as valid targets for each callsite.
For large binaries, such a policy would contain 1000s of targets per callsite. While still
more precise than existing defenses, it would still expose a large attack space. We leverage
the offset information at the callsite to obtain a more precise policy.
Given an offset at a callsite, during “Target Accumulation”, we obtain a basic policy for
each callsite that encompasses all the vfptrs (and thunks) at the given offset in all the
VTables in which the offset is valid. Additionally, we apply two filters to further improve
the policy precision. First, we note that target vfptrs for a callsite that is invoked on the
same object pointer as the host function must belong to the same VTables as the host
function. With this, we apply our first filter, called “Nested Call Filter”. Furthermore,
from Ob 3, the calling convention that is presumed at the callsite and the calling
convention adhered to by the target function must be compatible. Accordingly, we apply
the second filter called “Calling Convention Filter”.
We considered several other filters, but did not adopt them for various reasons. To
name a few, we could infer the number of arguments accepted by each function and require
it to match the number of arguments passed at the callsite; we could perform
inter-procedural data flow analysis to keep track of this pointers; and we could perform
type inference on function parameters and bind type compatible functions together.
However, at a binary level, such analyses are imprecise and incomplete. A function may
not always use all the arguments declared in source code, and thus we may not reliably
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obtain the argument information in the binary. Inter-procedural data flow analysis and
type inference are computationally expensive, and by far not practical for large binaries.
We will investigate more advanced filters as future work.

Basic Policy Based on the identified callsites and the VTables V , vfGuard generates a
basic policy. For a given callsite c with byte offset o, we define index k to be the index
within the VTable that the byte offset corresponds to (i.e., k = o/4 for 4-bytes wide
pointers). The legitimate call targets of c must belong to a subset of all the functions at
index k within in all the VTables that contain at least (k + 1) vfptrs. Here we assume
VTables to be zero-based arrays of vfptrs. That is:

T argets = {Vi [k] | Vi ∈ V, |Vi | > k},

where Vi is the VTable address point. |Vi | is the number of vfptrs in the VTable at Vi .

Nested Virtual Call Filter In some cases, this pointer used to invoke a virtual function
is later used to make one or more virtual calls within the function body. We refer to such
virtual calls as “Nested Virtual Calls”. vfGuard can generate a more precise policy for
nested virtual calls.

1. class M { virtual void vMfoo() {
2.
3.

this->vFn(); //or vFn();
}

4. };
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In the above example, vFn is a virtual function that is invoked on the same this pointer
as its host function M::vMfoo, which is also a virtual function. Underneath, the binary
implementation reuses the VTable used to invoke M::vMfoo to retrieve the vfptr (or thunk)
pertaining to vFn. That is, between the nested virtual calls and the host virtual function,
the vptr acts an invariant. Therefore at the nested callsite, target vFn must belong to a
VTable to which M::vfoo also belongs.
Given a virtual callsite with vfptr index k and host virtual function f , we can derive a
more precise policy for each nested virtual callsite within f :

T argets = {Vi [k] | Vi ∈ V, f ∈ Vi }

Nested virtual callsites can be easily identified using our intra-procedural data flow
analysis. First, we check whether the this pointer at the given callsite is in fact the this
pointer for the host function. That is, the expression for this pointer at that callsite should
be ecx0 for thiscall calling convention or esp0 + 4 for stdcall calling convention. Next,
we ensure that the host function is virtual. That is, there must exist at least 1 VTable to
which the host function belongs. Finally, the filtered targets are identified using the
equation above.
Note that the filter is applicable only in cases where host function is also virtual. If the
filter is inapplicable, vfGuard defaults to basic policy.

Calling-Convention based Filtering We filter the target list to be compatible with
the calling convention followed at the callsite. At the callsite, the register that is utilized to
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pass the implicit this pointer (CallVF) reveals the calling convention that the callee
function adheres to.
First, for each of the callsite target functions in the policy, we identify the calling
convention the function adheres to. Next, for each callsite, we check if there is a mismatch
between the convention at the callsite and the target, if so, we remove such conflicting
targets from the list. If we are unable to identify the calling convention of the callee –
which is possible if the callee does not use the implicit this pointer, we take a conservative
approach and retain the target.

Incomplete Argument Utilization Conceptually, all polymorphs of a function must
accept the same number of arguments. So, one potential filter could be to check if a
function accepts the same number of arguments that are passed at the callsite. If not, the
mismatching functions can be removed from potential targets for the callsite. However, in
the binary, we only see the number of arguments used by a function and not the number of
arguments it can accept. Therefore, argument count is not feasible as a filter.

3.2.7

Discussion

How to better identify VTable end points The strictness of the policy or the attack
space depends on the number of call-targets per callsite. Ideally, we want this number to
be as close to the ideal case as possible. However, inaccurate VTable end-points – specially
in MSVC ABI – result in inclusion of incorrect vfptrs into the policy.
Consider the layout in Figure 3.5. VA and VB are 2 VTables under MSVC ABI that are
contiguously allocated, where VA is comprised of entries f1−4 and VB of entries f5−6 . I1−3
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Fig. 3.5.: Actual and perceived VTable layouts under MSVC ABI.

are addresses within the function pointer array that manifest within the binary as
immediate values, where I1 and I3 are VTable address points and I2 is noise. Per
Algorithm 1, vfGuard identifies 3 VTables V1−3 with a total of 6+4+2=12 entries.
Accordingly (due to V2 ) f3 , f4 , f5 and f6 are incorrectly included in the policy for offsets 0,
1, 2 and 3 respectively, thereby compromising precision over soundness. Similarly, f5 and
f6 are allowed as legitimate targets for offsets 4 and 5 respectively.
One solution to such a problem would be to prune VTables based on the start addresses
of succeeding VTables in the memory. However, such a solution must have no false
positives in VTable start-addresses. In Figure 3.5, since I2 is an incorrect VTable address
point, f3−4 would be incorrectly excluded from V1 thereby leading to false positives during
enforcement. Another solution could leverage more restrictions from the ABI and language
semantics to better demarcate VTables. For example, colocated functions at a given offset
must be compatible with each other with respect to types of arguments accepted and type
of value returned.
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Virtual-dispatch-like C calls Our virtual callsite identification has captured all
required steps for a virtual dispatch according to C++ ABI specifications, but it is still
possible that some functions in the C code could resemble a legitimate C++ virtual
function dispatch. For example:
struct B{void *ptr; void (*fn) (struct A*);};
struct A{struct B *pb;};
void foo(struct A* pa) {
pa->pb->fn(pa);
}
In the binary, the above C statement resembles a C++ virtual call dispatch. pa being
passed as an argument satisfies SetThis and could be perceived as a callsite. Commercial
compilers tend to follow a finite number of code patterns during a virtual call invocation. A
potential solution could classify all the callsites based on code patterns used to perform the
dispatch and look for abnormalities. For example, to dispatch virtual calls in mshtml.dll,
the compiler typically invokes virtual calls using a call instruction of the form, “call [reg +
offset]” where as, g++ produces code that performs, “add reg, offset; call reg”. While this
is not a standard, a compiler tends to use similar code fragments to dispatch virtual calls
within a given module. Since a sound policy must prevent false callsites, one can filter the
potential incorrect callsites by looking for persistent virtual dispatch code fragments.
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3.2.8

Summary

vfGuard recovers C++-level semantics, particularly virtual callsites and VTable
information from C++ binaries to generate precise CFI policy. It offers more stringent
protections for virtual function dispatches – over 95% more precise when compared to
Total-CFI and other state-of-the-art binary-level defenses.

3.3

Attack Space Reduction through Stack-Pointer Integrity (SPI)

While Total-CFI increased precision of CFI policies, and vfGuard improved it further
by recovering C++-level semantics, the lack of all pertinent high-level semantics lead to an
theoretical attack surface. For example, with access to source code, SafeDispatch [4] and
VTV [6] can recover precise C++ class hierarchy and therefore generate ideal policies for
virtual function dispatches.
A recent attack called Counterfeit Object Oriented Programming (COOP) [65] takes
advantage of attack surface made available by C++-level defenses including vfGuard.
While vfGuard is most resilient to COOP when compared to other binary-level defenses, it
does suffer from some limitations. Over time, attacks and defenses against code-reuse
attacks have led to a cat and mouse game that has prompted to rethink defense against
code-reuse attacks.
ROP, a particular type of code-reuse attack, is so popular and mature as an attack
mechanism that there exist tools to automatically extract gadgets [8] from programs and
compile them [9] (i.e., chain them) to implement program logic.
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A key component of ROP attacks is stack pivoting, a technique that positions the stack
pointer to point to the ROP payload – an amalgamation of data and pointers to gadgets.
Our defense stems from the observation that during ROP, each gadget behaves like an
instruction with complex semantics, and the stack pointer performs the role of a program
counter. Therefore, traditional CFI, which imposes integrity restrictions on the program
counter under the regular execution domain, transforms into integrity restrictions on the
stack-pointer in the ROP domain. Fundamentally, SPI as a property requires that: (1) at
any point during execution, the stack pointer remains within the stack region of the
currently executing thread, and (2) stack pointer is conserved across function execution.
That is, the size of the stack frame allocated to a function for execution is equal to the size
of the stack frame deallocated after the execution of the function. During the stack-pivot
operation of an ROP attack, at least one of the two requirements is violated. Based on
location of the payload, we divide SPI into two categories: Coarse-Grained SPI, which
defends against attacks where the ROP payload is on non-stack segments (e.g., heap), and
Fine-Grained SPI, which defends against attacks where the ROP payload is on the stack.
SPI has several advantages over prior binary-level ROP defenses:
1. SPI is a non-control-flow approach and makes no assumptions regarding the size or
instruction semantics of gadgets. In fact, SPI is oblivious to the concept of a
“gadget”, and operates at the instruction level.
2. SPI is impervious to ASLR. Threat model addressed by SPI allows for ASLR to be
turned off and yet, defend against ROP.
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3. SPI allows for incremental deployment. That is, only specific modules can be
protected, and the protected modules can inter-operate with unprotected modules.
4. Finally, coarse-grained SPI – which is sufficient to protect against all heap-based
ROP attacks – offers very low overhead.

3.3.1

Motivation

ROP Payload
Injection
Heap Spray,
Stack Overflow,
Stack Injection

Exploitation

Use-after-free,
Integer/buffer
overflow, etc.

Stack Pivoting
mov %rax, %rsp; ret
xchg %rsp, %rax; ret
add $0x28, %rsp; ret
sub $0x40, %rsp; ret
etc.

Gadget-Chain
Execution
Call preceeding gadget,
Function entry gadget,
Unintended instruction
gadget

Fig. 3.6.: Steps involved in executing a typical ROP attack.

Code-Reuse Attacks A schematic overview of steps involved in a ROP attack is
presented in Figure 3.6. Jump-Oriented Programming (JOP) [66], a variant of ROP uses a
pop followed by an indirect jmp instruction instead of a ret instruction as the last
instruction of the gadgets. Without loss of generality, in this work, we use the term ROP
to include JOP and other known code-reuse attacks. The attacker first injects the payload
into the victim process’ memory. Here, and in the remainder of the paper, we refer to ROP
payload or payload as the combination of data and addresses of the gadgets that the attack
executes. Note that ROP payload is different from the malicious executable payload that is
commonly executed after DEP is bypassed.
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In theory, an attacker can inject ROP payload into any segment that is writable. In
practice however, a vast majority of browser exploits utilize a popular and convenient
technique called Heap Spray, wherein the payload is dumped onto the heap. The payload
can also be injected into the stack region, where the attacker often misuses stack variables,
or in the case of stack overflow, overflows the stack to store the ROP payload. Depending
on the nature of the vulnerability and constraints specific to the attack, an attacker may
choose to (or need to) inject payload in a specific writable section of the program memory.
The second step exploits the vulnerability in the victim process. This step is
independent of the nature of vulnerability (e.g., use-after-free, integer overflow, buffer
overflow, etc.). At the end of this step, the attacker controls the program counter. She may
also control certain registers depending on the nature of the attack.
The third step is the execution of stack-pivot gadget, which loads the address of the
location where ROP payload is stored into the stack pointer. This step definitively
transforms the execution to the ROP domain, and the stack pointer assumes the role of the
program counter. Stack pivoting is crucial for the attacker to convert an instance of single
arbitrary code execution into continuous execution of malicious logic.
Finally, an indirect branch instruction (typically ret or pop reg followed by jmp reg) at
the end of the stack pivot gadget triggers the execution of the chain of gadgets directed by
the payload.

Stack Pivoting A requirement for stack-pivot operation is to write to the stack pointer.
We refer to such instructions as “SP-update” instructions, short for stack-pointer update
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instructions. Depending on the location of the payload and the nature of the write
operation, we further classify SP-update instructions into:
• Explicit SP-update: These instructions perform an explicit write operation that
alters the stack pointer (e.g., mov esp, eax; add esp, 0x10; etc.). Explicit
SP-update instructions occur in two forms:
– Absolute SP-update: These instructions write an absolute value or register into
the stack pointer. For example, mov esp, eax; xchg eax, esp; pop esp, etc.
are absolute SP-updates.
– Relative SP-update: These instructions alter the stack pointer by a fixed offset
(e.g., add esp, 0x10; sub esp, 0x10; etc.).
• Implicit SP-update: These instructions alter the stack pointer as an implicit effect
of another operation. pop eax, ret, retn, etc. are examples of implicit
SP-updates.
Typically, stack-pivot requires an explicit SP-update instruction. On one hand, because
absolute SP-update instructions can load an arbitrary value into the stack pointer, they are
a popular choice for stack pivot. However, they typically require that the attacker controls
a register and loads it with the address of the payload, which depending on the nature of
the exploit, may or may not be possible. On the other hand, relative SP-update
instructions are useful to move the stack pointer by fixed relative offsets, and therefore are
useful when the payload is within the stack region. Implicit SP-update instructions are
least capable because they can only move the stack pointer by small offsets. Most practical
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attacks store payload on the heap, and utilize an absolute SP-update instruction for
pivoting. However, a determined attacker can, and will resort to using relative SP-update
instruction if defense against abuse of absolute SP-update instructions for pivoting becomes
prevalent. In this paper, we focus on eliminating stack pivot operations that utilize explicit
SP-update instructions. Whereas implicit SP-updates can in principle be used for stack
pivot, we did not find any in practice. We elaborate on implicit SP-updates in Section 5.4.
Stack Pivot within Stack Region: When the payload is located within the stack region,
stack pivot moves the stack pointer either along the direction or against the direction of
stack growth. We define Stack-Forward Pivot to signify movement of stack pointer along
the direction of stack growth, and Stack-Backward Pivot to signify movement of stack
pointer against the direction of stack growth. Since stack pointer always points to the top
of active (or live) stack region, stack-forward pivot implies that the payload is located in
the stale (or dead) region of the stack (Figure 3.7(b)). Assuming that stack grows from
higher to lower address, stack-forward pivoting is usually accomplished by subtracting an
offset from the existing value of stack pointer. Stack-backward pivoting (Figure 3.7(a))
moves the stack pointer into the active region of the current function’s or a callee
function’s stack frame by adding an offset to the stack pointer.
As an example, In Figure 3.7(a), the attacker performs stack-backward pivoting. She
first injects the payload into variables in function f2. When f3 is invoked, she exploits a
vulnerability in f3 and pivots the stack by adding an offset to stack pointer to point to the
base of the payload in f2’s stack frame. In Figure 3.7(b), the attacker performs
stack-forward pivoting by pivoting into the stale portion of the stack. First, she injects
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payload into f6’s stack frame. When f6 returns to its caller f5, a vulnerability in f5 is
exploited. Finally, a pivot that subtracts an offset from the stack pointer to point to the
base of the payload is executed.

Legitimate Use Cases for Explicit SP-update Instructions There are some
legitimate use cases for explicit SP-update instructions. Under normal execution, the stack
pointer of a thread is indicative of stack region being used by the thread. When a function
is invoked, space on the stack – called function frame – is allocated for the function, and
when the function returns, the same amount of space that was allocated is reclaimed.
Allocation and deallocation are accomplished by simply moving the stack pointer by the
amount of stack space the function requires. Typically, when the size of the stack required
by a function is known during compile time, the compiler inserts relative SP-update
instructions to allocate and deallocate the function stack frame. For example, in LLVM
clang compiler, frame allocation is accomplished via a sub offset, %rsp instruction (or the
push instruction), and deallocation is accomplished through add offset, %rsp instruction.
In fact, other than frame allocation and deallocation, we found no legitimate uses of
relative SP-update instructions.
Furthermore, while infrequent, the compiler sometimes introduces absolute SP-update
instructions to initialize the stack pointer. When the size of a function’s stack frame is
unknown during compile time (e.g., when the function allocates stack space dynamically
using alloca), the compiler inserts code to calculate the appropriate frame size at runtime
and using an absolute SP-update instruction, initializes the stack pointer with the correct
value. There are also legitimate uses of absolute SP-update instructions when the stack is
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unwound (e.g., during an exception). In such cases, the value of the stack pointer is
calculated and initialized at runtime. C compilers that target flavors of Windows OS utilize
a helper routine called chkstk and invoke it when the local variables for a function exceed
4K and 8K for 32 and 64 bit architectures respectively. chkstk checks for stack-overflow
and dynamically grows the stack region using an absolute SP-update instruction – if the
stack growth is within the thread’s allowable stack limit.

3.3.2

SPI – Overview

The execution of stack-pivot during a ROP attack signifies the transformation from
regular execution to ROP. Post stack-pivot, the stack pointer assumes the role of program
counter. Specifically, we observe that similar to how arbitrary code execution violates the
integrity of control-flow (i.e., integrity of program counter), pivoting the stack violates the
integrity of stack pointer. With this in mind, we present Stack-Pointer Integrity (SPI), a
program property that mandates two runtime invariants:
• Stack Localization (P1): At any point during execution of a program, stack frame
(or stack pointer) of the currently executing function exists within the stack region of
the currently executing thread.
• Stack Conservation (P2): The size of the stack frame allocated before the
execution of a function is equal to the size of the stack frame deallocated after
execution of the function.
We observe that during a ROP attack, depending on the location of payload, stack
pivoting violates at least one of P1 or P2. We divide SPI into Coarse- and Fine-Grained
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SPI. An overview of defense based on payload location is presented in Table 3.3.
Coarse-Grained SPI enforces Stack Localization in order to defeat all attacks that pivot to
payloads located outside the stack region (e.g., heap), and Fine-Grained SPI (1) enforces
Stack Conservation to defeat stack-backward pivoting to payloads within the active stack
region (Figure 3.7(a)), and (2) sets the stale stack to zero in order to eliminate gadgets in
stale region of the stack (Figure 3.7(b)), and therefore defeats stack-forward pivoting.
Note that SPI is significantly different from other stack protection schemes (e.g., [67]).
Stack protection schemes are concerned with the integrity of the contents of the stack,
whereas SPI enforces runtime invariants P1, P2 in order to ensure the integrity of the
stack pointer.
In the following, we first present the threat model that SPI addresses, then present an
overview of coarse- and fine-grained SPI.
void f1() {
//f1 stack vars
f2();
}

f1()'s
stack
frame

void f2() {
//f2 stack vars
//accept input
f3();
}

f2()'s
stack
frame

void f3() {
f3()'s stack
//vulnerability!!!
frame
}

(a)

f4()'s
stack
frame

%rsp

ROP Payload

ROP Payload

Stack
Pivot

f5()'s stack
frame
f6()'s
stack
frame
(stale)

%rsp

void f4() {
Stack Bottom
//f4 stack vars (High Address)
f5();
}
void f5() {
//f5 stack vars
Stack
f6();
Growth
//vulnerability!!!
}
void f6() {
//accept input
}
Stack Top

(Low Address)
(b)

Fig. 3.7.: Fine grained SPI. (a) Stack-Backward Pivoting (b) Stack-Forward Pivoting

Threat Model Our solution assumes an adversary who has the capability to exploit a
vulnerability in a program and achieve arbitrary code execution. Further, irrespective of
ASLR, we assume that the adversary has full knowledge of the program layout and can
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Table 3.3: SPI Defense Overview
SPI
Granularity
Coarse
Fine

Type of
Pivoting
Outside stack
segment
Stack-Backward,
As in Figure 3.7(a)
Stack-Forward,
As in Figure 3.7(b)

Defense
Technique
StackPtr bounds
checking
Shadow
StackPtr stack
Zeroing of
stale stack

successfully locate useful gadgets in the memory. Strong ASLR will only improve the
protection provided by our solution. We impose no restrictions on the size of the gadgets
and allow an adversary to utilize large gadgets – like ones used in [11] and [10] – that can
successfully evade state-of-the-art binary-level CFI defenses.
Further, we assume that the attacker has injected the ROP payload into the victim
memory and requires to perform stack pivoting in order to trigger the execution of the
gadget chain. In fact, the only requirement for SPI to be a fruitful defense against ROP is
that the stack pivoting be required in order to carry out the attack. Our threat model is no
more restrictive than state-of-the-art ROP defenses – if not lesser.

Coarse-Grarined SPI Coarse-grained SPI is an implementation of Stack Localization
and addresses out-of-stack pivoting. Since stack pointer is indicative of the stack frame, P1
is nothing but:
StackBaseT hread < StackP ointer < StackLimitT hread
Pivoting outside the stack region requires the stack pointer to be altered by a large
offset, which is suitably accomplished using an absolute SP-update instruction. Therefore,
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in a nutshell, during coarse-grained SPI, we instrument each absolute SP-update
instruction and assert that the new value of stack pointer lies within the stack region.

Fine-Grained SPI Fine-grained SPI is an implementation that defends against pivoting
within the stack region. Each explicit SP-update instruction results in the movement of
stack pointer. Under normal execution, movement of stack pointer along the direction of
stack growth occurs during a function frame allocation and the reverse movement occurs
during a function frame deallocation. Stack Conservation requires that the size of
allocation is equal to the size of deallocation (P2). That is, for a given thread of execution:
StackP ointerBef oreF unc() == StackP ointerAf terF unc()
We maintain a per-thread shadow stack that keeps track of the stack pointer, and
update the shadow stack after every explicit SP-update instruction. The value of stack
pointer upon allocation is pushed on to the shadow stack. When a frame is deallocated,
the value of stack pointer is required to match the value of stack pointer that was stored on
the stack to ensure that there is no pivoting.
The shadow stack can only defend against attacks that violate Stack Conservation.
That is, they employ stack-backward pivoting (Figure 3.7(a)), where the payload is located
in the active region of the stack. In the case of stack-forward pivoting, one solution is to
take an approach similar to the CFI-based defenses. That is, we could statically analyze
the binary to generate a CFG and assert that the sizes of succeeding function frames are in
accordance with the CFG. The problem with such a solution is that it inherits the
coarse-grained nature of binary-level CFI approaches. Specifically the problems are two
fold: first, it requires a complete CFG, therefore the solution is not incrementally
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deployable. Second, due to lack of source code, one is forced to provide a coarse-grained
policy, which, depending on the complexity of the program, is likely to provide sufficient
attack space. That is, even with a conservative approach, we are likely to end up with
several allowable frame sizes for succeeding functions in the CFG, thereby accommodating
an attack space. We observe that the principle of use-after-def extends to function’s stack
frame:
Use-after-def (P3): A function’s stack frame can only be used after it is defined.
Stack-forward pivoting violates this requirement. P3 must be true irrespective of the
function that is invoked. We take a conservative approach and set the allocated stack
region to 0, when a function’s stack frame is allocated. This way, we effectively destroy any
possible payload that may be present in the stale region of the stack. Details and
optimizations are presented in Section 3.3.4.
By defending against stack-pivot, SPI can afford the attacker precise knowledge of
gadgets in the memory. This feature distinguishes SPI from gadget-elimination-based
approaches. Consider the code that is embedded into JavaScript code of some real-world a
exploits:
try { l o c a t i o n . h r e f= ’ ms−h e l p : / / ’ } catch ( e ) { }

The above JavaScript code loads hxds.dll, MS Office help library. hxds.dll is
non-relocatable and is always loaded at the same location in the memory. Moreover, it
contains absolute SP-update instructions that can be used to execute a pivot. By loading
hxds.dll, an attacker effectively invalidates ASLR. This is analogous to code-reuse attacks
described by Snow et al. [21], but without any JIT code.
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Elimination of Unintended SP-update Instructions As a final step, we eliminate
all the unintended explicit SP-update instructions. SPI protects all the intended explicit
SP-update instructions in the program. However, an attacker can utilize the unintended
instructions that could result due to mis-aligned instruction access. Considerable research
has gone into removing unintended gadgets from the program (e.g., G-Free [23], in-place
code randomization [22]). We simply leverage these efforts to render the
SPI-protected-binary free of explicit SP-updates. Unlike prior efforts, our threat model
accommodates any sequence of instructions terminated by an indirect branch instruction as
a potential gadget. Therefore, we eliminate unintended SP-update instructions as opposed
to eliminating all the gadgets.
Furthermore, the number of unintended SP-update instructions are very few in number
when compared to the number of gadgets considered for elimination by [22]. This is due to
the vast number of one-byte indirect branch instructions (e.g., 0xc3 is a ret instruction)
that gadget elimination approaches must eliminate. In comparison, most explicit SP-update
instructions manifest as infrequent multi-byte instructions. Therefore, our modifications
are less intrusive and often eliminate all the unintended explicit SP-write instructions.
Interleaved Data and Code: It is possible that code and read-only data are interleaved in
the executable section of a binary. While such a binary violates the fundamental tenets of
DEP, unfortunately they do exist. For example, SPI – and other gadget elimination
solutions – can not eliminate gadgets in such read-only data. However, a source code level
implementation of SPI must ensure that no data is contained within executable regions.
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Program (LLVM
Bitcode)

LLVM
Codegen

Elimination of Unintended
SP-update Instructions

SPI Runtime

Program
Binary

Fig. 3.8.: Work-flow of SPI

Work-flow of our defense is presented in Figure 3.8. The implementation comprises of
SPI Pass, a LLVM code generation pass that performs instruction-level instrumentation to
capture the explicit SP-updates, and a runtime that provides the implementation of the
core functionality like assertion of P1, P2.

3.3.3

Coarse-Grained SPI

Algorithm The algorithm for coarse-grained SPI is presented in Algorithm 2. Given a
P rogram, Enf orceCoarseSP I iterates over each instruction in the program and identifies
absolute SP-update instructions. When such an instruction is found, a call to
CoarseCheck is inserted after the instruction. The StackP tr is passed as an argument.
Generally, displacement of stack pointer due to intended relative SP-update instructions is
small when compared to the size of the stack region (8 MB on 64 bit Linux). Therefore, we
limit the coarse-grained protection to absolute SP-update instructions. However, if tighter
protection is needed, relative SP-update instructions can also be instrumented to invoke
CoarseCheck.
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The goal of CoarseCheck is to assert P1 – that is, the value of stack pointer lies within
the stack region of the currently executing thread. Every thread of execution has
associated with it, a Thread-Specific Data (TSD) structure (Thread Information Block
(TIB) in flavors of Windows OS), that contains information regarding the currently
executing thread. For example, TIB contains addresses of bottom and top of stack, process
ID, thread ID, exception handling related information, etc. TSD structure is directly
mapped to the base of gs or fs segment registers for 64 and 32 bit variants respectively.
First, StackBase and StackLimit of the current thread is retrieved from the TDS of the
thread. If the StackP tr does not lie within the interval (StackBase, StackLimit), a
violation of P1 is inferred, and the execution is aborted.
Enf orceCoarseSP I is implemented within the SPI code generation pass, and the
implementation dependent CoarseCheck is implemented within the target-dependent
runtime.
Algorithm 2 Coarse-Grained SPI. Given the llvm bitcode P rogram, a call to CoarseCheck
is inserted after each absolute SP-Update instruction.
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:

procedure EnforceCoarseSPI(P rogram)
for each Inst in P rogram do
if Inst is SP -U pdateAbsolute then
Save Live Registers
InsertCall CoarseCheck(StackP tr)
Restore Saved Registers
end if
end for
end procedure
procedure CoarseCheck(StackP tr)
StackBase ← T SD.GetStackBase()
StackLimit ← T SD.GetStackLimit()
if StackP tr ∈
/ (StackBase, StackLimit) then
abort()
end if
end procedure
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Coarse-grained SPI can protect against all attacks that contain non-stack payloads.

3.3.4

Fine-Grained SPI

Fine-Grained SPI defends against ROP attacks that contain stack-based payloads.
Specifically, P2 and P3 are enforced to protect against stack-backward and stack-forward
pivoting respectively.
Algorithm 3 presents the algorithm for fine-grained SPI. Similar to coarse-grained SPI,
the instrumentation function: Enf orceF ineSP I is implemented as a LLVM code
generation pass (SPI Pass), and the target-dependent implementation of GetSize and
U pdateSP are implemented within the runtime.

Stack-Pointer Shadowing We use a shadow stack to guard against stack-backward
pivoting. Goal of the shadow stack is to track the movement of stack pointer across stack
allocations and deallocations. Specifically, a thread-specific stack is created and stored
within the TSD, and when a new stack frame is allocated, the value of stack pointer before
allocation is pushed on to the shadow stack, and when the frame is deallocated, the value
at the top of the shadow stack is popped, and the new value of stack pointer is checked
against the popped value. A match ensures that stack frame is conserved.
In Algorithm 3, U pdateSP determines if an SP-update instruction is an allocation or
deallocation by comparing the current value of StackP tr against previously encountered
value. A lower value (assuming the growth of stack from higher to lower address) indicates
allocation and a higher value indicates deallocation (line 20 in Algorithm 3).
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In 64 bit Linux, the TSD structure can only be accessed through the gs segment
register 1 . In order to prevent an attacker from gaining access to the TSD structure, during
code generation and through elimination of unintended explicit SP-update instructions, we
limit access to TSD within SPI runtimes.
In some cases, specifically during exception handling, it is possible that multiple stack
frames are unwound and the execution does not resume at the immediate caller function.
In such cases, the stack pointer is restored to an earlier stack frame using an absolute
SP-update instruction. To accommodate such cases, if the value of the stack pointer during
U pdateSP does not match the top of the stack, elements from the shadow stack are
popped till a match is found. If no match is found, violation of P2 is inferred.

Stale-Stack Zeroing We zero the stale (or inactive) stack region in order to defend
against stack-forward pivoting. In principle, if a function frame utilizes x bytes on the
stack, once the function returns, the x bytes are dead and ready for reuse. By zeroing the
deallocated stack region, we ensure that any possible gadgets in the region are eliminated
(P3). Zeroing the stack frames of all the functions upon return is redundant and
performance intensive. Suppose all the functions in a binary: (1) contain only direct branch
instructions, and (2) contain no absolute SP-update instructions, such a binary can not be
used for stack pivot operation. Conversely, only functions that contain either indirect
branch instruction or absolute SP-update instruction can be used for stack pivoting.
Pivot-Safe Functions: We define Pivot Safe functions, the functions that can not be used for
stack-forward pivoting, and exclude such functions from zeroing. A function is Pivot Safe if:
1. It contains no absolute SP-update instructions, and
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Algorithm 3 Fine-Grained SPI. Instrumentations are performed after the SP-Update instructions.
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:
29:
30:
31:
32:
33:
34:
35:
36:
37:
38:
39:

procedure EnforceFineSPI(P rogram)
for each F unction in P rogram do
if F unction is not P ivotSaf e then
Save Live Registers
InsertCall zbytes ← GetSize(StackP tr)
InsertCodeToZero
Restore Saved Registers
end if
for each Inst in F unction do
if Inst is SP -U pdateExplicit then
Save Live Registers
InsertCall U pdateSP (StackP tr)
Restore Saved Registers
end if
end for
end for
end procedure
procedure UpdateSP(StackPtr)
Stack ← CreateOrGetShadowStackT LS()
if StackP tr < Stack.T op then
Stack.P ush(StackP tr)
if StackP tr < Stack.Lowest then
Stack.Lowest ← StackP tr
end if
else
Stack.P opU ntil(StackP tr)
if Stack.Empty() then
abort()
end if
end if
end procedure
procedure GetSize(StackPtr)
Stack ← GetShadowStackT LS()
if Stack.Lowest < StackP tr then
size ← (StackP tr − Stack.Lowest)
Stack.Lowest ← StackP tr
return size
end if
end procedure

. Set zbytes bytes from StackP tr to 0

. Allocation

. Deallocation

. Pivoting detected

2. It contains no indirect branch instructions
Stack-forward pivot instructions are found in frame allocations. In pivot-safe functions,
there is direct flow of control between each allocation and the corresponding deallocation of
stack frame. Therefore, every potential stack-forward pivot instruction is met with an
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opposite stack-backward pivot instruction that nullifies the effect of pivoting. All other
functions are Pivot Unsafe.
It is not necessary to zero the stale stack before a pivot-safe function. When a
pivot-unsafe function is encountered, it is possible that the allocated frame contains
potential payload. It is necessary to zero the stale stack before the function executes.
However, we are only required to zero the amount of stack that was used between the
previous and current pivot-unsafe functions. In order to accomplish this, within the TSD
structure, we also maintain the lowest value of the stack pointer (line 23 in Algorithm 3),
which is the farthest the stack has grown between any two successive pivot-unsafe functions.
During stack allocation within the prologue of a pivot-unsafe function, we first obtain the
size of the stack that needs to be zeroed from GetSize, and then zero those many bytes
from the stack pointer (line 6). GetSize accordingly adjusts the lowest point (line 36).
This way, we vastly reduce the number of functions in which the stack must be zeroed. For
example, in 64 bit gnu libc library, we found that over 70% of functions are pivot-safe.
An example of zeroing code (line 6): the one we use in our proof-of-concept
implementation of SPI is as follows:
mov zbytes, %rax;
mov %rsp, %rdi;
mov %rax, %rcx;
shr $0x3, %rcx;
xor %rax, %rax;
rep stosq;

//rsp is the StackPtr

64
With precise analysis, it may be possible to exclude certain SP-unsafe functions as
SP-safe (e.g., if it can be proven that the indirect branch instruction can not be used
achieve stack-forward pivoting) thereby further reducing the number of functions that
require stack zeroing. However, we do not conduct such analysis in this work.
Partial Zeroing: In theory, we do not have to zero all the stale stack region between 2
successive pivot unsafe functions. In fact, zeroing a “few” bytes starting from the stack
pointer may be sufficient to render stack-forward pivoting useless. However, it is important
to note that since implicit SP-update instructions are unprotected, an attacker could
leverage intended or unintended sequence of implicit SP-update instructions pop, retn to
walk-across the zeroed bytes and reach the payload. One solution would be to statically
analyze and identify the maximum number of bytes an attacker could move the stack
pointer using implicit SP-update instructions (intended or unintended), and set at least as
many bytes to 0. This solution is a trade-off between performance and incremental-deploy
ability because, it involves analysis of all the modules in the process memory, which may
not be known ahead of time.

v oi d f oo1( i nt y ) {
v oi d * p = al l oc a( y ) ;
...
}

foo1:
push %rbp
mov %rsp, %rbp
1 sub $0x20, %rsp
...
v oi d f oo2( ) {
v oi d * p = al l oc a( 128) ;
mov %rsp, %r8
...
sub %rax, %r8
}
2 mov %r8, %rsp
...
1, 2, 3 Allocation
4 mov %rbp, %rsp
pop %rbp
4, 5 Deallocation
ret

foo2:
push %rbp
mov %rsp, %rbp
3 sub $0xa0, %rsp
...
5 add $0xa0, %rsp
pop %rbp
ret

Fig. 3.9.: Dynamic allocation of stack space using alloca
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Dynamically Allocated Stack Memory When stack space is dynamically allocated
using a function like alloca, the user does not need to explicitly free the memory.
Implementations of alloca are often provided by the compiler. At the time of invocation,
the stack pointer is adjusted to claim the additional stack space, and when the function
returns, the stack pointer is restored to its original value to account for frame deallocation.
If the compiler can statically compute the requested size, it can perform the stack allocation
using a relative SP-update instruction, otherwise it uses an absolute SP-update instruction.
For example, in Figure 3.9, in function foo1, the argument to alloca is a variable.
Therefore, the compiler allocates 0x20 bytes (marking 1) required by the function, then
adjusts stack pointer (%rsp) using an absolute SP-update instruction, by subtracting a
value corresponding to the argument to alloca (marking 2). When the function completes
execution, the stack pointer is simply restored to the value at function entry (marking 4),
thereby satisfying Stack Conservation (P2). However, in the case of foo2, the compiler
statically determines the argument to alloca and allocates (and deallocates) 0x20 + 0x80
= 0xa0 bytes (markings 3 and 5) using relative SP-update instructions. In both cases, a
call to U pdateSP (as in Algorithm 3) is inserted after the explicit SP-update instructions
in order to update the shadow stack correspondingly. When U pdateSP is invoked after
marking 4 in foo1, two elements are popped out of the shadow stack, one for each
allocation at markings 1 and 2 respectively.

Explicit SP-update Injection through JIT Gadgets injected into Just-In Time (JIT)
code by an attacker are particularly hard to protect against [21]. However, code generator
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within a JIT engine can be modified to instrument all explicit SP-update instructions to
enforce SPI. Also, all unintended SP-update instructions can be removed.

3.3.5

Discussion

Code-Reuse Attacks without Stack-Pivot The key requirement for code execution is
a reliable means to repeatedly move the program counter. Under normal execution, x86
hardware increments the instruction pointer after every instruction, similarly, under
traditional ROP, pop and ret instructions allow for movement of the stack pointer, which
assumes the role of program counter. In principle, as long as an attacker has access to
repeated indirect branching, code-reuse attacks can not be eliminated.
Schuster et al. introduce COOP [65], code reuse attacks for C++ programs. They
leverage loops that execute virtual functions as program counter. By controlling the loop
counter and the array of virtual functions that are executed, they achieve arbitrary code
execution. In such code-reuse attacks, there is no need for stack pivoting. However,
because different virtual functions do not accept the same number of arguments, when
executed from the same callsite, Stack Conservation property of SPI is violated, and can
therefore be stopped by SPI.

3.4

Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate each of the three solutions presented in this dissertation
with particular focus on attack space reduction. The performance evaluation and
enforcement is presented in Chapter 4.
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3.4.1

Challenges

Obtaining real-world exploits: Obtaining real-world exploits is a challenging task and
not the focus of this dissertation. Therefore, in our work, we utilize synthetic exploit
samples available through the Metasploit [68] penetration test framework. Note that this
step does not affect the quality of evaluation since the vulnerabilities exploited by the
samples from Metasploit are recent and real, and are used by real-world exploits.

Evaluating attack space reduction through SPI: SPI is a non-control-flow-based
approach. Therefore, unlike semantic recovery based approaches, the idea of “allowable
targets” for each indirect branch instruction does not hold. The primary means to evaluate
SPI is the execution overhead (more in Chapter 4) it presents when compared to the lack
of it. In this section, we evaluate the feasibility of SPI as a solution when compared against
gadget elimination techniques.

3.4.2

Evaluation Test Set

We evaluate Total-CFI on a corpus of exploits from Metasploit. We include a kernel
exploit to demonstrate the ability of Total-CFI to perform system-wide detection.
Furthermore, to evaluate vfGuard, we consider a set of C++ program modules
presented in Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8. Firstly, our test set comprises of programs containing
between 100 and 2000 VTables, thereby providing sufficient complexity for analysis.
Secondly, the modules in the test set are a part of popular browsers like Firefox and
Internet Explorer, which are known to contain several vulnerabilities. SpiderMonkey is the
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JavaScript engine employed by FireFox and Table 3.8 presents some of the modules used
by Internet Explorer that contain reported vulnerabilities. Finally, the test set contains
both open (Table 3.6, 3.7) and closed source programs (Table 3.8). While vfGuard
operates on raw COTS binaries, open source programs provide the ground truth to
evaluate vfGuard’s accuracy. Along with SpiderMonkey and the modules used by IE, the
set consists of dplus browser, an open source browser and TortoiseSVN, an open source
Apache subversion client for Windows.
Finally, to evaluate SPI, we consider popular opensourced suites such as GNU Binutils
and Coreutils and SPEC-INT 2006 benchmark. We also evaluate the number of SP-update
instructions in popular (and vulnerable) DDLs in Windows XP and Windows 7.

3.4.3

Recovering Function-Level Semantics

Total-CFI was implemented as a plugin for DECAF [69], which is a modification of
Qemu [70] version 1.0.1, a full system emulator. Qemu offers transparency and the ability
to monitor the entire system, and has been widely used [71, 72] in research. DECAF
modifies dynamic translation code of Qemu to incorporate opcode specific callbacks into
the translation blocks. It also modifies the TLB cache manipulation code to dispatch a
callback whenever an entry is made to the TLB cache. In all, Total-CFI consists of 3.8K
lines of C code. In this section, we present the evaluation of Total-CFI. All the
experiments were performed on a system with Intel core i7, 2.93GHz Quad core processor
and 8GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 10.04 with Linux kernel 2.6.32-44-generic-pae.
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Name

Version

Calculator
Notepad
Internet
Explorer
Firefox
Adobe Reader
Google Talk
Microsoft Paint
Windows Media
Player
XPS viewer
Yahoo Messenger
Apple
Quicktime
Apple iTunes
Process
Explorer
Filezilla
Google chrome
Windows Messenger
RealPlayer
DivX Player
Winamp
VLC
Media
Player
Skype
Registry Editor

6.1
6.1
8.0

.reloc
Fiber
Dyn
present? present? Code
present?
7
7
7
7
7
7
3
3
3

3.5
8.1.1
1.0.72
6.1
12.0

3
7
3
7
3

7
7
7
7
7

3
3
3
7
3

6.1
8.1.0.29

3
7

3
7

3
7

7.69.80.9

3

7

3

10.2
15.05

3
3

7
7

7
7

0.9.40.0
18.0.1025
4.7

7
3
7

7
7
7

7
3
7

11
6.2.5
5.2
1.1.11

7
7
7
7

7
7
7
7

3
3
3
3

5.10.0.116
6.1

3
7

7
7

3
7

Table 3.4: False positives on Windows OS

CVE
CVE-2010-0249
CVE-2010-3962
CVE-2011-0073

Application
(Version)
Internet Explorer (6.0)
Internet Explorer (6.0)
FireFox 3.5.0

Attack Technique

Exploit EIP

Target EIP

Uninitialized memory. Heap spray
Incorrect variable initialization. Heap spray
Dangling pointer abuse

0x7dc98c85
0x71a51440
0x00346e54

0x0c0d0c0d
0x71a52c66
0x01730ee5

CVE-2011-0257

QuickTime 7.6

Buffer overflow

0x0044888d

0x00194ab0

CVE-2006-1016
CVE-2009-3672
CVE-2006-1359
CVE-2010-4398∗

Internet Explorer (6.0)
Internet Explorer (6.0)
Internet Explorer (6.0)
Windows 7 kernel

Stack Overflow
Incorrect variable initialization. Heap-spray
Incorrect variable initialization. Heap-spray
Improper driver interaction. Buffer overflow

0x773f67a8
0x74913ff2
0x7c8097f3
0x95dca042

0x0c112402
0x0013e0d4
0x77c3210d
0xb8cb8694

Table 3.5: Summary of Exploits

False-Positive evaluation To measure its accuracy, we tested benign applications and
exploits on Total-CFI to check for false positives and false negatives. We ran Total-CFI
on 25 common applications that are listed in Table 3.4, on Windows XP and Windows 7.

Vulnerable
Module
mshtml.dll
mswsock.dll
js3250.dll
QuickTimePlayer.exe
ws2 32.dll
mshtml.dll
mshtml.dll
win32k.sys
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We observed that several pre-loaded application executables in Windows do not contain
relocation table in them. For such executables, we parsed the PE file and extracted
statically determinable addresses into the whitelist. 0 exploits were reported in all 25
applications.

False-Negative evaluation To check the effectiveness of Total-CFI on detecting
exploits, we ran Total-CFI on 7 recent real-world exploits that have exploits available in
the MetaSploit framework, and one Windows 7 kernel exploit. All the exploits were
detected. The summary of exploits and their detection are listed in Table 3.5. It is worth
noting that the kernel exploit, CVE-2010-4398, which starts as a user mode program,
exploits a vulnerability in Win32k.sys and eventually escalates privilege. A crafted
REG BINARY value for SystemDefaultEUDCFont registry key is inserted to cause a
stack-based buffer overflow in the RtlQueryRegistryValues function in Win32k.sys.
Monitoring a user program (or a set of user programs) alone is insufficient in identifying
such an attack. It is essential to monitor both the kernel code and the user level code to
diagnose such attacks. Detailed results are tabulated in Table 3.5.

3.4.4

Recovering C++-Level Semantics

We implemented vfGuard in the following code modules. The CFI model generation
part of vfGuard is implemented as a plugin for IDA-pro v6.2. An open source
IDA-decompiler [61] was modified to perform data flow analysis for callsite identification.
The platform consists of 5.6K lines of Python code and 3.4K lines were added to it.
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We evaluated vfGuard in several respects. We first evaluated the accuracy of virtual
callsite and VTable identification using several open source C++ programs, because source
code is needed to obtain ground truth. Then, we measured the policy precision and
compare with BinCFI [40] and SafeDispatch [4]. To evaluate the effectiveness of vfGuard,
we tested multiple realworld exploits. Finally, we measured vfGuard’s coverage with
respect to number of indirect branches protected, and performance overhead of policy
enforcement.
Program
SpiderMonkey
dplus-browser 0.5b
TortoiseProc.exe

Ground
Truth
811
270
568

vfGuard

FP

FN

942
334
595

13.9%
19.1%
4.7%

0
0
0

Table 3.6: VTable Identification accuracy.

Program
SpiderMonkey
dplus-browser 0.5b

Ground
Truth
1780
309

vfGuard

FP

FN

1754
287

0
0

1.4%
7.1%

Table 3.7: Callsite Identification Accuracy

Identification Accuracy To ensure policy soundness, vfGuard must identify all
legitimate VTables and must not identify any false virtual callsites. To measure the
accuracy, we picked SpiderMonkey and dplus-browser for the Itanium ABI, and
TortoiseProc for the MSVC ABI. We constructed the “ground truth” by using compiler
options that dump the VTables and their layouts in the binary. Specifically,
-fdump-class-hierarchy and /d1reportAllClassLayout compiler options were used to
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compile the programs on g++ and Visual Studio 2013 respectively. The results are
tabulated in Table 3.6. The compilers emit meta-data for (1) each class object’s layout in
the memory, and (2) each VTable’s structure. We compared each of the VTables obtained
from the ground truth against vfGuard. None of the legitimate VTables were missed in
each of the cases. In all the cases, VTables identified by vfGuard contained some noise
(from 4.7% to 19%). This was expected due to the conservative nature of vfGuard’s
VTable scanning algorithm.
To evaluate callsite identification accuracy of vfGuard, we leveraged a recent g++
compiler option, -fvtable-verify [6] that embeds checks at all the virtual callsites in the
binary to validate the VTable that is invoking the virtual call. We compiled SpiderMonkey
with and without the checks, and matched each of the callsites that contained the compiler
check to the callsites identified by vfGuard. Out of the functions that were successfully
analyzed, vfGuard reported 0 false positives. It reported 1.4% and 7.1% false negatives
(i.e., missed during identification) for SpiderMonkey and dplus-browser respectively.
These experiments indicate that the generated policies should be sound but a little
imprecise, due to the noisy VTables and missing callsites.

Program

Avg.
Targets
per CS
(Basic Policy)

# Nested
CS

Avg.
Targets
per CS
(NCF)

ExplorerFrame.dll
msxml3.dll
jscript.dll
mshtml.dll
WMVCore.dll

231
96
39
292
268

257
219
55
211
562

227
88
38
258
256

Avg.
Targets
per CS
(NCF+
CCF)
223
84
38
257
244

Estimated
call Targets
– BinCFI

Call Target
Reduction
w.r.t BinCFI

8964
6822
2314
16287
8845

97.5%
98.8%
98.4%
98.3%
97.3%

Table 3.8: Average targets for the basic policy and the filters
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Policy Precision To measure how precise our generated policies are, we generate
policies for C++ binary modules in Internet Explorer 8. Table 3.8 presents the average
number of targets per callsite under 3 configurations – basic policy, basic policy with
Nested Callsite Filter (NCF) and basic policy with Nested Callsite Filter and Calling
Convention Fiilter (CCF). Additionally, for each case, we estimated the number of targets
in a policy generated by BinCFI. We included into the policy all the function entry points
in the program. The exact reduction in the number of targets is tabulated in the last
column. We can see that even with the basic policy generated by vfGuard, we were able to
refine BinCFI’s policy by over 95%. Here, the refinement numbers pertain to the virtual
callsites protected by vfGuard and not all the indirect branch instructions within the
module. An optimal defense will combine vfGuard’s policy for virtual callsites along with
those generated by BinCFI (or CCFIR) for other branch instructions.
mshtml.dll

WMVCore.dll

mshtml.dll

1000

100

10

1

WMVCore.dll

100

Number of VTables

Number of Callsites

10000

0
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40

50

60

Offset
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80

90 100 110 120
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1
0

75

150

225

300

VTable Size

Fig. 3.10.: Distribution of callsites across various offsets

In general, we found no obvious correlation between the number of callsites and
VTables in the binary to the effectiveness of the filters. While the filters improved precision
in some cases, they did not in others. Graphs in Figure 3.10 show the scattered
distribution of number of callsites with respect to offset within the VTable at the callsite,
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and the number of VTables that contain a particular VTable size for mshtml.dll and
wmvcore.dll. As expected, we found several VTables with small sizes of less than 10
elements. However, we also found a significant number of VTables between sizes 50 and
125. While the algorithm used by vfGuard is efficient in detecting the VTable start
address, it is not very accurate in detecting the end points. This is the main hurdle for
lowering the average call targets per callsite.
We also evaluate the precision of the policy generated by vfGuard as compared to
SafeDispatch, a source code based solution. To estimate the policy produced by
SafeDispatch, we modified g++ compiler option -fvtable-verify implementation. For
every invoked callsite, it will insert code to output the number of possible targets. We
compiled SpiderMonkey with this modified g++ compiler and ran its test cases. We
observed that the average number of call targets per callsite is 109, and the maximum is
335. In comparison, vfGuard generated a policy for SpiderMonkey with 199 call targets per
callsite on average and a maximum of 943 targets. This result indicates that the precision
of CFI policies generated by vfGuard is within the same order of magnitude as those
generated from a source code based solution.
CVE
2010-0249
2013-1690
2011-1255

Target Application
Internet Explorer
Firefox
Internet Explorer

Module
mshtml.dll
xul.dll
mshtml.dll

2010-3962

Internet Explorer

mshtml.dll

2013-3893

Internet Explorer

mshtml.dll

Remark
Fake VTable
Fake VTable
Fake VTable
Mis-aligned
VTable access
Fake VTable

Table 3.9: Exploit mitigation. VTable based vulnerabilities.
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Policy Effectiveness To assess the policy effectiveness, we conducted a survey on
VTable related exploits. In particular, we found five working exploits towards Internet
Explorer and Firefox, and listed them in Table 3.12. We tested the two exploits that target
mshtml.dll. Being protected with the generated policy for mshtml.dll, Internet Explorer
was able to detect these exploits successfully.
In CVE-2010-0249, an attacker sprays the heap with fake VTables and corrupts a stale
object pointer by setting its vptr to the heap sprayed region. Then, at a callsite inside
mshtml.dll!CElement::GetDocPtr(), attacker controlled vfptr is retrieved and executed.
Since the attacker supplied vfptr is not a part of the policy for the callsite, it is flagged by
vfGuard as an exploit.
In the case of CVE-2010-3962, mshtml.dll inadvertently increments the vptr of an
object. So, in the virtual dispatch in CLayout::EnsureDispNodeBackground(),
[address-point + offset + 1] is retrieved as the address of the vfptr instead of
[address-point + offset]. Since the mis-aligned pointer does not belong to the policy,
vfGuard flags it as an exploit. While we tested the above exploits successfully, more
exploits in Table 3.12 follow the same modus operandi.

3.4.5

Quantifying Attack Space

Semantic recovery based approaches enforce CFI, which is dictated by the precision of
the CFG. Attack space available to an attacker can be quantified by considering the
possible number of targets at a particular indirect branch instruction.
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Program
ExplorerFrame.dll
msxml3.dll
jscript.dll
mshtml.dll
WMVCore.dll

Avg.
Targets
per CS
(DEP Only)
842,091
640,727
548,490
4,585,953
1,589,907

Avg.
Targets
per CS
(Total-CFI)
8964
6,822
2,314
16,287
8,845

Avg.
Targets
per CS
(vfGuard)
223
84
38
257
244

Table 3.10: Attack space reduction

Table 3.10 presents the reduction in attack space across two semantic recovery
approaches presented in this thesis. Since vfGuard protects only the virtual callsites, we
compare the attack space available between DEP-only, Total-CFI and vfGuard for virtual
callsites. While Total-CFI was able to improve precision by eliminating 99.473% targets,
vfGuard was able to eliminate 99.999% targets in comparison with DEP-only protection.

3.4.6

Stack-Pointer Integrity

We implemented a prototype for coarse- and fine-grained SPI. The instrumentation
phase (Figure 3.8) was implemented by adding a code-generation pass to the LLVM-3.5.0
compiler. As a proof-of-concept, we also implemented the target-dependent runtime for 64
bit Linux (version 3.2.0). SPI LLVM pass comprises of 315 lines of C++ code for
coarse-grained, and 2K lines of C++ code for fine-grained SPI. The runtime for
coarse-grained and fine-grained SPI are 20 and 230 lines of assembly code, respectively.

Pivoting in Practice In Table 3.11, we present some modules in Windows OS and the
common absolute SP-update instructions within them. We found xchg eax, esp to be the
most common pivoting instruction. Also, in Table 3.12, we present a corpus of recent
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Table 3.11: Absolute gadgets in Windows OS.
SPI
.reloc? defeats
pivot?
NO
X
NO
X
Yes
X
Yes
X
Yes
X

Gadget
Module

Gadget
Address

Pivot Instruction

0x51c2213f
0x51c00e64
0x77C3868A
0x7c342643
0x20302020

xchg eax, esp
xchg eax, esp
xchg eax, esp
xchg eax, esp
pop esp

0x1001d891

xchg eax, esp

Yes

X

Win 7

hxds.dll
hxds.dll
msvcrt.dll
NPJPI.dll
QickTime.qts
flashplayer.exe
v11.3.300.257
uxtheme.dll

0x6ce7c905

Yes

X

Win 7

uxtheme.dll

0x6ce8ab5e

mov esp, ebp
mov esp,
[edi + 0xffffffcd]

Yes

X

Program
Office 2007
Office 2010
Win XP SP3
Java Runtime
Apple QT
Adobe Flash

exploits on Metasploits and the instructions they utilize to accomplish pivoting.
Unsurprisingly, they use the xchg eax, esp instruction. It must be noted that exploits on
Metasploit are proof-of-vulnerability, and pivoting is independent of the vulnerability. That
is, depending on the attack specifics, a feasible pivot can be utilized for multiple exploits.
However, in practice absolute SP-update instructions are most popular to perform
stack-pivot.
Table 3.12: Pivoting instructions used by recent Metasploit exploits
CVE Number
2013-3897
2013-3163
2013-1347
2012-4969
2012-4792
2012-1889
2012-1535
2014-0515
2013-1017

Instruction

xchg eax, esp

mov esp, [eax]
pop esp
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Moreover, hxds.dll – the help library for MS Office is not relocatable and always loads
at the same address. An attacker can simply load and utilize the pivot gadgets within the
module. SPI is particularly useful in protecting such non-relocatable modules.
Coarse-grained SPI can defeat pivoting in all cases listed in Table 3.11 except the gadget at
uxtheme.dll:0x6ce8ab5e. uxtheme.dll contains read-only data interleaved with code in the
.text segment, and data item char s keyPublic1[] is at address 0x6ce8ab38. So SPI
and other gadget-elimination solutions can not eliminate the gadget.

SPI vs Gadget Elimination In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of SPI when
compared to gadget-elimination-based solutions, we list the number of explicit SP-update
instructions that SPI needs to protect as opposed to the total number of gadgets in
coreutils and binutils. The results are tabulated in Table 3.13. On one hand, we found that
benign programs contain none or very few absolute SP-update instructions. On the other
hand, the relative SP-update instructions are exclusive to function frame allocation and
deallocation. Absolute SP-update instructions, the most popular for stack-pivoting are a
very small fraction when compared to the total instructions in a program. Also, explicit
SP-update instructions that SPI needs to protect are much smaller when compared to total
number of gadgets that gadget elimination tools would need to eliminate.

3.5

Summary

In this section, we presented three integrity models in decreasing order of attack space.
Table 3.14 presents the scope of each of the integrity models proposed in this
dissertation in comparison with shortcomings of current defenses as presented in Table 2.1.
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Table 3.13: Explicit SP-Update instructions vs Gadgets
Suite

coreutils

binutils

Total
Program
Instructions
rm
cp
factor
sha512
sort
cat
wc
md5sum
split
objdump
objcopy
ld
nm
ar
readelf

9470
17403
9907
9969
19471
6704
5400
5659
9888
265075
230226
48964
189299
192428
60170

Absolute
Relative
Total
SP-update
SP-update
# Gadgets
Instructions Instructions
0
117
705
14
170
985
4
118
890
0
77
547
0
158
1053
4
133
475
0
77
490
0
71
441
4
108
579
49
1524
11673
16
1366
9921
1
705
2860
16
1104
8604
16
1118
8936
31
207
3868

Table 3.14: Scope of Integrity Models
Category

CFI

Artificial Diversity
Gadget Elimination

Parameter Total-CFI vfGuard SPI
Precision
X
X
Deploy-ability
X
Runtime
X
X
Performance
Gadget
X
Definition
Resilience
X
Diversification
X
Coverage
X

A check mark (X) indicates that the limitation is either eliminated or reduced by either
improving the parameter or by circumventing it. For example, SPI is independent of
diversification or definition of a gadget, therefore eliminates the limitation. Similarly, by
improving the precision of the CFI model, vfGuard can reduce the runtime overhead of
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enforcement because the number of indirect targets per virtual call instruction is reduced,
thereby reducing the number of lookups.
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4. INTEGRITY-MODEL ENFORCEMENT
Integrity model and its enforcement are independent of each other. That is, models can be
independently enforced using one of many enforcement mechanisms. In this chapter, we
present three different enforcement mechanisms we used in Total-CFI, vfGuard and SPI.

4.1

System-Wide Enforcement

We often do not know the vulnerable process or worse, processes that are exploited in a
target system. In such cases, it is essential to monitor the entire system to record any
violations that may occur. Moreover, system-wide enforcement has the advantage of
monitoring the OS kernel, which has not received sufficient investigation. As a result,
kernel exploit detection and diagnosis is still missing.

4.1.1

Performance Evaluation

Total-CFI was implemented as a plugin for DECAF [69], which is a modification of
Qemu [70] version 1.0.1, a full system emulator. DECAF modifies dynamic translation
code of Qemu to incorporate opcode specific callbacks into the translation blocks. It also
modifies the TLB cache manipulation code to dispatch a callback whenever an entry is
made to the TLB cache. In this section, we evaluate the performance of system-wide
enforcement of Total-CFI. All the experiments were performed on a system with Intel core
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Guest OS

Qemu

Total-CFI

WinXPSP3
Win7SP1

48s
1m 57s

1m 27s
3m 26s

Total-CFI +
WL Cache
1m 15s
3m 12s

Table 4.1: Times taken to boot Windows 7 and XP till the login screeen is reached

1725024

Avg. size
per file
(KB)
6.405

# files
without
.reloc
0

385

2853392

7.237

7

454

3496120

7.52

9

504

3900312

7.557

9

645

5672224

8.588

13

System
state

# files in
cache

Total Size
(B)

Login screen
Desktop
UI visible
Boot
completed
3 programs
running
5 programs
running

263

Table 4.2: Memory Overhead for whitelist cache on Windows 7

Fig. 4.1.: Performance of Total-CFI vs Qemu 1.0.1

i7, 2.93GHz Quad core processor and 8GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 10.04 with Linux
kernel 2.6.32-44-generic-pae.
We capture the performance overhead introduced by Total-CFI under two categories.
(1) Execution overhead and (2) Memory overhead. We conducted experiments to measure
the boot time execution overhead introduced by Total-CFI on Windows 7 and XP. The
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results are listed in Table 4.1. We consider boot time execution overhead under
performance evaluation because variety of activities occur during the system boot that
span across system level, user level and IO. Moreover, most module loads happen during
the system boot. Therefore, the boot process is perhaps the worst case scenario with
respect to performance overhead imposed by Total-CFI. Optionally, Total-CFI can be
turned on after the boot process and it can monitor the execution of all the newly created
processes from that point forward.
In Table 4.1 Total-CFI is configured in 2 modes, with and without caching of the
whitelists. With whitelist caching enabled, the overhead on Windows XP and 7 were found
to be 56.2% and 64.1% respectively. Keeping integration with hardware in mind, we also
captured the memory overhead introduced by Total-CFI to maintain the shadow whitelist
during the boot process on Windows 7. The memory overhead indicates the amount of
memory required to store the whitelists. The results are tabulated in Table 4.2. We found
the average overhead per file to be 7.46KB. We observed that the whitelist for files without
.reloc section tend to be larger in size since Total-CFI takes a conservative approach to
extract all the statically determinable addresses from the binary. Furthermore, from our
experiments, we found that even with large number of programs in the memory (such as
Microsoft Office applications, Adobe flash, IE, Google Chrome and so on), no more than
1000 files were present in the whitelist cache. At the rate of 7.46KB per file, one would
need to set aside approximately 8MB in the hardware for the whitelists, which is
conceivable. In combination with a carefully designed cache flush policy to accommodate
for even larger number of files in the memory, we believe that integrating whitelist
management into the hardware is not far fetched.
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Furthermore, we ran the Pass Mark [73] CPU and Memory benchmark on Total-CFI.
The results are shown in Figure 4.1. The CPU benchmark on Total-CFI showed an
average overhead of 4.4% over Qemu and the memory benchmark showed an average
overhead of 19.8%.

4.2

Process-Level Enforcement

In process-level enforcement, the monitoring is restricted to a particular process.
Because the kernel is not monitored, performance of process-level monitoring is better than
whole-system monitoring.
We enforced the policy generated by vfGuard by running the program on Pin [74]: a
dynamic binary translator. A PinTool was written using 850 lines of C++ code to perform
policy enforcement. In our proof-of-concept approach, we intercept the control flow at
every previously identified callsite and check if the call target is allowable for the callsite. If
the target is dis-allowed, the instance is recorded as a violation of policy. Effective
enforcement must impose low space and runtime overheads. Under the basic policy,
vfGuard captures the policy within 2 maps. The first map Mcs maps a callsite to the
VTable offset at the callsite, and the second map Mtarget maps a given target to a
160-bitvector1 that represents the valid VTable offsets for the given target. That is, ith bit
set to 1 indicates that the target is valid for offset i ∗ 4. For a given CS, a Mcs entry is
readily derived from τval in Equation 3.1 in Section 3.2.4. Mtarget is populated from the
identified VTables (Section 3.2.5). For each VTable entry, the corresponding bitvector is
1

The size of the bitvector is dictated by the size of the largest VTable in the binary. We found 160 to be
sufficient.
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updated to indicate a 1 for the offset at which the entry exists within the VTable. vfGuard
performs 2 map lookups and 1 bitvector masking to verify the legitimacy of a given target
at a callsite. That is, for a given callsite (CS) and target (T ), the target is validated if:

BitM ask(Mcs (CS)) & Mtarget (T ) 6= 0

(4.1)

Such a design enables quick lookup and limits space overhead from duplication of
callsites and targets within the maps. While the map lookups and bitvector masking result
in constant time runtime overhead, the space requirements of Mcs and Mtarget are linear
with resepct to number of callsites and targets respectively.
In case of callsites whose targets were filtered, the target lookup is different from basic
policy. Each callsite CS – whose targets were filtered – is associated with a map
MF iltered (CS) that maintains all the allowable call targets for CS. During enforcement,
vfGuard first checks if the callsite is present in MF iltered (CS) and validates the target. If
callsite is not present in MF iltered (i.e., targets for the callsite were not filtered), vfGuard
performs the 2 map lookup and verifies the target through Equation 4.1. Enforcing the
filtered policy introduces greater space overhead. The main reason being: targets reappear
in multiple MF iltered for each of the callsites that the targets are valid at. We wish to
investigate better enforcement in our future work.

Effect of Module-Level ASLR:

vfGuard performs policy enforcement with or without

module-level ASLR enabled. At a module granularity, the base addresses of the modules
are randomized. That is, the modules are loaded at different addresses during each
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instance of loading. The callsite and targets in Mcs , Mtarget and MF iltered are stored as
(module, offset) tuple rather than the concrete virtual address. When a module is loaded,
the virtual addresses of callsite and target addresses are computed from the load address of
the module.

4.2.1

Cross-Module Inheritance

In practice, classes in one module can inherit from classes defined in another
module [75]. Therefore, as new modules are loaded into a process address space, the
allowable call targets for callsites in existing modules need to evolve to accommodate the
potential targets in the new module. Given a list of approved modules that a program
depends on, vfGuard can analyze each of the modules to generate the intra-module policy.
From the execution monitor, vfGuard monitors module loads to capture any newly loaded
modules and their load addresses. Intra-module policies are progressively adjusted (for
ASLR) and maps Mcs , Mtarget and MF iltered are updated so as to capture the allowable
targets for various callsite offsets across all approved modules. If a target in an unapproved
modules is invoked, vfGuard records it as a violation.

4.2.2

Performance Evaluation

vfGuard performs policy enforcement using PinTool, a publicly available process-level
runtime execution monitor. To measure the performance overhead imposed by vfGuard, we
opened load-intensive webpages on Internet Explorer and recorded the overhead on 3
individual modules with respect to Pin as baseline. The results are graphed in Figure 4.2.
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Fig. 4.2.: Performance overhead imposed by vfGuard

Overall, we found an average overhead of 18.3%. We made no attempt to optimize the
runtime performance of policy enforcement. While this performance overhead is not
impressively low, it is aligned with other binary-level CFI protection solutions, such as
BinCFI.

4.3

IR-Level Compile-Time Enforcement

In SPI, the enforcement is performed at the LLVM IR level. IR-level enforcement is
accomplished purely through static analysis, and therefore has the advantage of not
requiring any changes to the system. Moreover, the LLVM IR can either be derived from
the program source code using a front-end like clang, or by lifting the binary using a
platform like McSema [76].
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4.3.1

Performance Evaluation

We evaluate the performance of coarse- and fine-grained SPI on SPEC-INT 2006
benchmark, and performance of coarse-grained SPI on GNU coreutils (ver 8.23.137) and
GNU binutils (ver 2.25). The results for SPEC benchmark are presented in Figure 4.3 and
4.4, and results for coreutils and binutils are presented in Figure 4.5 and 4.6. Overall, we
found that coarse-grained SPI imposes very little overhead. Average overhead of
coarse-grained SPI was found to be 1.04% for SPEC benchmark, 1.99% for binutils and
0.7% for coreutils. This is due to the infrequent use of absolute SP-update instructions in
the binary. For example, 5 out of 9 programs that we tested in coreutils contained no
absolute SP-update instructions.
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Fig. 4.3.: SPEC INT 2006 performance benchmark for coarse-grained SPI

As expected the overhead imposed by fine-grained SPI was higher, with an average of
29.93%. We found two main causes for the overhead. Firstly, C++ programs tend to
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Fig. 4.5.: Coarse-grained SPI performance for GNU Coreutils

contain several virtual function dispatches, which are implemented using indirect call
instruction. Each function that invokes a virtual function is pivot-unsafe, and therefore
results in frequent zeroing. For example, in Figure 4.4, astar, which is a C++ program
imposes the most overhead of 87.16%. Secondly, a significant part of the overhead occurs
due to zeroing, which is O(n) with respect to the amount of space to be set to zero. In
astar, 52% of the overhead occurs due to zeroing. At the cost of deploy-ability, the cost of
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Fig. 4.6.: Coarse-grained SPI performance for GNU Binutils

zeroing can be lowered by incorporating the “partial zeroing” technique described in
Section 3.3.4.

4.4

Other Enforcement Strategies

Other enforcement techniques such as Binary Rewriting( [77] and [78]) as used
by [24, 30, 40], in-memory enforcement by injecting code into process memory (e.g., using
Browser Helper Objects [79]), etc. are equally feasible. Prior approaches (e.g., [24, 30, 40])
have leveraged static instrumentation to introduce Inline Reference Monitors (IRMs) to
check the legitimacy of a branch target at runtime. We believe such approaches can
improve the performance of vfGuard. Furthermore, depending on the number of modules
loaded, the size of callsite and target maps can increase to result in significant memory
overhead, specially in case of filtered targets. In such cases, cross-module dependencies can
be analyzed to only allow cross-module calls in cases where known dependencies exist,
thereby controlling the size of various enforcement maps.
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5. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this section we discuss the limitations of each of the solutions described in Chapters 3
and 4, and derive motivation for future work.

5.1

Attack Space in vfGuard

While vfGuard improves the precision with respect to state-of-the-art binary-level
defenses like BinCFI, it still has several inaccurate edges in the CFG. For example, in
Figure 3.5, while ground truth contains 6 function pointers, vfGuard identifies 3 VTables
with a total of 6+4+2 = 12 function pointers. This results in an attack space that only
increases with the number of VTables in the system. In future, we intend to investigate
techniques to improve VTable demarcation.
COOP [65] demonstrates an attack that leverages such redundancy in VTable-based
defenses. However, it is important to note that the nature of defense provided by vfGuard
ensures that turing-completeness can not be achieved within the attack space [65].

5.2

Low precision due to indirect jmp and ret instructions

vfGuard only improves the precision for indirect call instructions. From Table 5.1, we
can see that indirect call instructions form a significant fraction of the overall indirect
branch instructions. However, other indirect branch instructions – indirect jmp and ret
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Program
ExplorerFrame.dll
msxml3.dll
jscript.dll
mshtml.dll
WMVCore.dll

# Indirect call
instructions
7797
5439
2235
9843
9748

# Indirect jmp
instructions

# ret
instructions

87
78
5
352
50

7266
6157
4430
15479
8497

(51.2%)
(46.6%)
(33.5%)
(38.3%)
(53.3%)

Total #
Indirect branch
instructions
15227
11674
6670
25674
18295

Table 5.1: Profile of indirect branch instructions

instructions continue to suffer from low precision. As a part of future work, we will
investigate generic approaches that recover high-level semantics to impose restrictions on
all indirect branch instructions, and not just indirect call instructions.

5.3

Stack-Pointer-Aligned Payload

Fig. 5.1.: Stack-pointer-aligned payload

SPI addresses the integrity of the stack pointer, which is violated during stack pivoting.
While stack pivoting is required in accomplishing most real-world ROP exploits, some
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exceptions exist. Specifically, if an attacker can inject the payload to a location already
pointed to by stack pointer, there is no need for stack pivoting. This is specially the case
when the attacker can overflow the stack and control the return address (e.g., through a
buffer overflow attack). For example, in Figure 5.1, through a buffer overflow in the callee
function, an attacker can overwrite the return address to point to the first gadget in the
ROP payload. When the callee function returns, the ROP payload is executed.
Our solution can not protect against attacks that do not modify the stack pointer.
However, buffer overflow is a well studied problem (e.g, [5, 80, 81]) with practical
implementations. StackGuard [80], a popular solution incorporated into modern compilers
e.g., -fstack-protector in GCC and clang), introduces a randomly generated canary
between the return address and the local variables of a function. When the function
returns, if the canary is altered, an overflow is inferred. Most modern compilers not only
include support for stack canaries, but some also incorporate them as a default setting.

5.4

Pivoting through implicit SP-update instructions

In principle, implicit SP-update instructions can be used to perform stack pivoting,
however they are not as powerful as the explicit SP-update instructions. Unlike explicit
SP-update instructions, implicit SP-update instructions can only move the stack pointer by
small increments. Considering that an attacker has just one attempt at stack pivoting after
exploitation, unless the payload is close to the existing value of stack pointer, pivoting
through implicit SP-updates is hard. In fact, preventing pivoting through implicit
SP-update instructions presents two hard challenges. Firstly, several unintended implicit
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SP-update instructions like pop reg, push reg, ret, etc., which are all one-byte
instructions can be found in the memory. Eliminating each of them would compound the
complexities faced by gadget elimination approaches [22, 23]. Secondly, tracking the
movement of stack pointer at each of the implicit instructions would introduce a much
higher overhead than fine-grained SPI. This is the reason we limit SPI to tracking explicit
SP-update instructions.
However, as shown in Figure 1.1, SPI, in combination with CFI approaches can address
the problem of pivoting through implicit SP-update instructions.

5.5

Future Work

The redundancy in the CFI model generated by vfGuard arises due to two reasons: (1)
Incorrect VTable bounds, and (2) Lack of precise hierarchy information. In future, we
would like to perform analysis to more precisely generate class hierarchy information.
Particularly, corresponding entries in any two polymorphic VTables must be polymorphic
to each other. Therefore, the type of corresponding arguments must be compatible with
each other. We plan to leverage type analysis to generate more precise class hierarchy.
Furthermore, by combining training and theorem proving, we wish to recover more
semantics, specially the scope (i.e., visibility) related semantics like public, private,
protected, etc. in C++ binaries and incorporate them to generate a more precise CFI
model.
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6. CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, we sought to reduce the attack space in code-reuse attacks through
program integrity models. Particularly, we operated directly on the binary and addressed
several challenges including recovery of high-level semantics.
We proposed Total-CFI, which recovered function-level semantics from the binary to
generate more precise CFI model. Further, we proposed vfGuard, which recovers
C++-level semantics to provide a more precise CFI model for C++ binaries. In particular,
it protects C++ virtual function calls in the binary. In an attempt to further reduce the
attack space, we observed that stack pointer assumes the role of the instruction pointer in
code-reuse attacks. Therefore, CFI in regular execution domain is analogous to SPI in
code-reuse attacks. We implemented the SPI model, which provides strict protection with
low overhead.
Finally, we presented three modes of enforcement of the integrity models. Total-CFI
performed system-wide enforcement that enabled whole-system protection. vfGuard
performed process emulation by enforcing at a process level, and finally, SPI incorporated
the security checks by performing alterations the the LLVM-IR level.
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